Today Progressive States Network devotes its e-newsletter to "Election Integrity," and reports a dramatic swing back to paper ballots
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by Ken
The Progressive States Network puts out a twice-weekly e-mail newsletter, which
chronicles the victories and setbacks of the progressive movements in America's states; shine a light on the best practices and the worst schemes; and help legislators, activists, and journalists across the country connect what is happening in their own backyard and across the country.
Today's edition is likely to be of interest to a lot of DWT readers concerned about the growing threat of election-stealing. It's devoted entirely to the broad subject: Election Integrity – How We Lost It and How States are Getting It Back, also the title of Christian Smith-Socaris's lead article. In addition, there are articles on:
* Protecting Ballot Integrity
* Post-Election Audits That Work
* Stopping the Privatization of Elections
Along the way imagine my surprise to learn, for example, that:
(a) The writers consider paper ballots "the only true secure option," judging the problems with VVPATs (electronic voting machines with “voter verified paper audit trails”) too serious to be solvable; and --
(b) Instead of moving toward fancier and fancier electronic equipment, as everyone assumed would be the case with reforms paid for in part by the Help America Vote Act, the country is actually moving back to paper ballots.
This November, for the first time, a majority of voters in the country will cast a paper ballot on election day and just 36% will use electronic machines, marking movement in the direction of more secure paper-based elections. At least one state is also trying to recover funds spent on problem plagued machines, contending that machine companies have not fulfilled their contractual obligations to supply reliable voting equipment. Diebold, the most prominent manufacturer of voting systems has changed the name of its voting technology subsidiary so that voting machine problems don’t effect the reputation of the entire company.
Clearly the move away from electronic voting machines is a tremendous victory for voters and a boon for fair elections. However, other clear threats to the integrity of our elections remain. The controversy over electronic voting machines motivated many to look more closely at the safeguards that protect our election systems from fraud and manipulation, and what has been found is troubling. Paper ballots are clearly not enough to make our elections secure; we also need a reliable way to verify election results. Recognition of this fact has moved the election integrity debate forward into two additional areas: post-election audits and publicly controlled elections.
If you go to the above link to view this issue of Stateside Dispatch, you can also sign up to receive it regularly.
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Labels: election integrity, electronic vote theft, paper ballots, Progressive States Network, Stateside Dispatch
4 Comments:
I'm glad to hear this. It's long overdue.
As a programmer myself, I know how ridiculously easy it would be to rig an all-electronic machine count.
I could agree to a touchscreen machine that produced a human-readable card, which would then be verified by the voter and counted by optical scan. With such a system, at least there would be a paper trail for audit purposes.
I was intrigued by what the article has to say about machines with so-called voter-verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs):
"Unfortunately, VVPATs fail on at least two levels. First and foremost, research indicates that in practice few people review the paper ballot, which is often small and hard to read. Unless people are actually verifying their votes, the audit trail serves no purpose. Additionally, any malicious attempt to alter the vote totals on a machine could be arranged to also print the votes the voter intended on the paper trail ballot.
"It is also the case that without a procedure for auditing the results, there is no way to reconcile the vote total recorded by the machine with those reflected in the paper audit trail. Yet, most states with VVPATs do not have adequate audit procedures likely to detect manipulation."
It seems like good material, but then, PSN does good work.
Best,
Ken
I understand, most voters would be too lazy to double-check their votes on the card. But we don't need most voters to do that. If only a handful out of a thousand cry foul, that should trigger an audit into the machinery.
(And on that topic, the very idea of proprietary software that may not be inspected by elections officials is preposterous. That should never, ever be allowed under any circumstances. If a company wants their software to be kept secret, they should not bid on the contract. I think open source software would be absolutely ideal in this case, for all the right reasons.)
The actual counting of votes has always been vulnerable to fraud, and no system can be completely safe from that. THAT is the real purpose of the human-readable cards - to verify, in case it should become necessary, the machine count.
In addition, vote tampering in any election from local on up, should be made a federal crime punishable by a minimum of ten years in the slammer.
"The very idea of proprietary software that may not be inspected by elections officials is preposterous."
Thanks for bringing that up. "Preposterous" is indeed the word for it -- that and outrageous.
Best,
Ken
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