Wall Street Gets Even More Demanding Of Their Congressional Puppets

Remember the old days when all Wall Street demanded personnel-wise was that they always get to name the Treasury Secretary? Well, a few weeks ago we found out that now they're demanding that they get another Wall Street whore as DCCC chair when Israel shuffles off into oblivion; their candidate is Jim Himes (New Dem-CT). And yesterday the Washington Post reported that Wall Street is doing what they can to make sure Sherrod Brown is not the replacement for retiring Tim Johnson as Budget Committee Chairman. That means shoveling big piles of money towards Republican candidates running for the Senate.

Wall Street is pumping more money into Republican campaigns this election cycle, betting that a flip in the Senate could usher in revisions to a key financial reform law.

In past cycles, aside from the last presidential election, securities and investment firms have hedged their bets by donating roughly the same amount to both parties. But this time Wall Street has handed Republicans nearly two-thirds of the $115 million it has contributed to 2014 campaigns, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.

…The Democratic majority in the Senate has blocked House attempts at sweeping changes to the reform law, agreeing only to a few revisions of a statute addressing insurance regulation. There is palpable concern on Wall Street that Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), known for his tough stance on big banks, could take the helm of the committee if his party retains control of the chamber. The liberal Democrat has championed legislation to force big banks to sock away more capital to guard against another economic downturn, a bill the industry excoriated as being too severe.

One bank executive called the prospect of Brown ascending to the top seat "frightening" because the senator has showed no interest in finding common ground with large banks. "You can sit down and reason with him about how the industry is smaller, how larger banks are smaller, but none of it matters at the end of the day," said the bank executive, who like others requested to speak anonymously to share candid views about lawmakers.

If the Democrats do retail control of the Senate, the Wall Street banksters could force their puppet Chuck Schumer, who has seniority over Brown, to take the job. And if he refuses, there's always Menendez, another corrupt Wall Street shill. But the banksters have made it clear what their strategy is with their campaign contributions this cycle. Here are the 10 biggest recipients of Finance Sector legalistic bribes among candidates and incumbents in hot races this year:

• Mitch McConnell (R-KY)- $3,047,218
• Tom Cotton (R-AR)- $1,584,582
• Lindsey Graham (R-SC)- $1,360,934
• Mike McFadden (R-MN)- $1,119,867
• Gary Peters (New Dem-MI)- $1,057,105
• Mark Udall (D-CO)- $1,023,796
• Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV)- $926,465
• Kay Hagan (D-NC)- $909,099
• Bill Cassidy (R-LA)- $883,967
• Thom Tillis (R-NC)- $850,504
• Cory Gardner (R-CO)- $822,097

Don't worry about Schumer. They schmeered him with another $1,459,749, even though he has no race-- bringing his bankster bribery total since 1990 to $20,892,289, the most of any non-presidential candidate in history.

If Wall Street's going to make a stink about Sherrod Brown, a delightful alternative as Budget Committee Chair would be the banksters most-hated (and feared) senator, Elizabeth Warren. Yesterday, on an interview with Steve Inskeep of NPR about the Carmen Segarra revelations about the Fed, she once again demonstrated why they have some much antipathy for her.

STEVE INSKEEP: You described what you learned from this report as disturbing. What's disturbing about it?

ELIZABETH WARREN: Well, ultimately this report tells us exactly what we already knew-- that the relationship between regulators and the financial institutions they oversee is too cozy to provide the kind of tough oversight that's really needed.

STEVE INSKEEP: How is it too cozy? Because of course we hear the regulators on these tapes saying: "There's a reason that we're trying to have good relationships with banks like Goldman Sachs-- we want to know what's going on, we want to get information."

ELIZABETH WARREN: Oh, golly. So, look-- listen, though, to those tapes. For me, there were two things that jumped out. The first was just a basic lack of truthful reporting: Supervisors are actually telling examiners not to report accurately the damning things they heard from bank executives during meetings. I mean, wow. If there's not even an accurate record of what's going on, then the regulators can't hope to do their jobs.

And the second thing: Look at how the Fed emphasized talk instead of action. You know, the regulators seemed to think that it was a victory just to raise an issue, even if they took absolutely no action to address the issue. And that's the kind of approach that allowed banks to take on massive risks before the financial crisis.

You know, think about that: The regulators seemed to think that fussing at banks behind closed doors was their toughest sanction. Does anyone believe that Goldman Sachs is gonna give up a deal that would yield millions of dollars because someone fussed at them behind closed doors?

STEVE INSKEEP: The regulators described this particular deal-- that was reported on in great detail on the tapes-- as a transaction that was legal but shady. Uh, it did seem to be within the rules. Does that call for a proper-- does that suggest a problem with regulators or the rules?

ELIZABETH WARREN: You know, for me it starts as a problem with the regulators-- and let me describe it this way: You know, the cultural problem isn't just some secondary concern. It's the whole ballgame.

We can keep making the rules tougher and tougher, but it won't make an ounce of difference if the regulators won't enforce the rules that are there. If the regulators back down or back off whenever the banks tell them to, then it's the banks-- and not the regulators-- who are running the show… [T]he first thing we can do is expose it. I mean, that's where this really starts-- that's the first step. And that's why it is I want to see oversight hearings-- I want to get a complete picture of what's happened here. ...

But we need to move on this and move quickly, because the big banks are just getting bigger, and they're taking on new kinds of risks. We need regulators who understand that they work for the American people, not for the big banks.

STEVE INSKEEP: Carmen Segarra, the woman who made these tapes-- and who was fired from the Fed-- sued, and her lawsuit was thrown out. One way to describe the reason it was thrown is simply that the whistleblower statutes did not apply to her-- she had not exposed a violation of regulations, she had exposed something short of that that was troubling to her.

Do you think the whistleblower statutes should be expanded in some way?

ELIZABETH WARREN: Yeah, I think that's one of the things that ought to be on the table. I mean, look-- we need to look at whether or not we've got the right tools to protect the kind of people who will speak up. But, but what we've got to start with is we've got to expose what happened here, we've got to look at what the available tools are, but we've got to give the message loud and clear to the Fed: Um, this isn't gonna work-- you work for the American people, you don't work for the big banks.

STEVE INSKEEP: I suppose if a Goldman official was sitting here, they might point out Goldman was complying with the law-- at least according to some of the regulators-- and the problem was whether they were doing something that was around the edges of the law, so to speak.

ELIZABETH WARREN: Yeah, but this is partly the role of a regulator. A regulator doesn't say to a big financial institution: "Hey! Step right up here. Get your toes on the line, and so long as you can make a legal argument that you have not crossed the line, then, hey, we're-- we're all cool here."

That's not the way regulation of large financial institutions is supposed to work-- they're supposed to be using judgment. And remember, part of this judgment is about whether or not there has been compliance with the law. The fact that Goldman could mount a legal defense here is not really the point of these tapes. The point of these tapes is that the regulators are backing off long before anyone's in court making a legal argument about whether or not they came right up to the line or they crossed over the line.

STEVE INSKEEP: Do you think regulators in a situation like that could say, "Listen, this may be legal, but I don't like it-- don't do it"?

ELIZABETH WARREN: You know, I think what regulators can do, is they can remind these large financial institutions that there's a lot of room in there for the large financial institutions to get themselves into trouble and to get the entire economy into trouble.

I mean, look, that's what happened in 2008-- the regulators stood by as the big financial institutions kept loading up on more and more and more risk. The regulators had the tools to say to the big financial institutions, "Hey, guys, you gotta back off-- you're putting the whole system at risk when you do this." And yet the regulators didn't do that. They were willfully blind to what went on.

And what we're seeing here is that same kind of cozy relationship, as the big financial institutions continue to run their operations, taking on more risk, doing what they want to do and brushing their regulators aside.