Oh no, not more on Iraq?!

Of course Marc Thiessen is an idiot, an ignoramus, a lunatic, and a thug, but does everyone know this? Like his editors at the Washington Post? They publish stuff like this, after all, without labeling it as "toxic ravings of an idiot, ignoramus, lunatic, and thug."

What can the United States do? It has already done quite a bit, of course. The invasion of Iraq, in 2003, by destroying the Iraqi state, empowered the Shiite majority—Maliki in particular. As long as American troops remained in Iraq, they could restrain Maliki and his Shiite brethren from their worst sectarian impulses. . . .

In Iraq, as in Syria, the choices are almost all bad, and the potential for American influence is limited. . . .

The “divine conquest” of Mosul by a group of Islamic extremists is a bitter consequence of the American invasion. For now, there seems to be very little we can do about it.

-- Dexter Filkins, in his June 23 New Yorker
"Comment" piece, "Wider War"

by Ken

Believe me, about the last thing I wanted to do was return to the subject of Iraq. But especially because the right-wing loony tunes who made such a mess of it on their last go are now pounding the subject so hard -- as if they had anything to contribute on the subject except their massive ignorance and shame -- and also because the situation in the Middle East is so inflammatory, it's not going to go away anytime soon, unless maybe the Fox folks get tired of it. And as Howie too has been pointing out, the historical blindness here is so acute, we have to try to do some shouting of our own, if only to begin to get a sense of how truly limited, if not nonexistent, our options are, and to understand how, as always, the actions we take as a result of craven domestic political considerations are all but guaranteed to make things worse rather than better.

I really hate to divorce this chunk of Dexter Filkins's latest New Yorker "Comment" on the subject from his necessarily brief but provicative (and naturally depressing) review of the current situation in Syria and Iraq (by no means identical, but with many similar elements in play) and the wider and widening Middle East mess. But since the Infotainment Snoozemedia obsession is going to hammering away at What We Have to Do, I think it's important to stay focused on how fucked-up the situation already is and how easy, perhaps inevitable, it is to only fuck it up worse. (Filkins, for those who don't know his work, is a veteran of a whole bunch of war-zone reportings, with a special emphasis on the serial fuckings-up in Iraq.)

Midway (or so) through the new piece, Filkins asks: "What can the United States do?"

It has already done quite a bit, of course. The invasion of Iraq, in 2003, by destroying the Iraqi state, empowered the Shiite majority—Maliki in particular. As long as American troops remained in Iraq, they could restrain Maliki and his Shiite brethren from their worst sectarian impulses. By the time the last troops departed, the civil war, which began in 2006, had been brought under control. But, in the two and a half years since the troops’ departure, Maliki has been free to pursue a stridently sectarian project, which has cut the Sunnis off from political power. He has alienated—even, in some cases, arrested—the most reasonable Sunni leaders and embarked on mass arrests of young Sunni men. In the process, Maliki has to a great extent driven the Sunnis back into the arms of the extremists. Indeed, in the sectarian calculus that now dominates Iraqi politics, Sunni unrest has worked largely in his favor, as it has allowed him to portray himself as the Shiites’ protector. The Iraqi state, built mainly by the Americans, is too feeble to resist the Sunnis’ efforts to break away.

For a time, in the waning months of the occupation, the White House and Maliki considered keeping some American troops in Iraq, in non-combat roles, ostensibly to train soldiers but also to help manage the nation’s politics. No deal was ever struck, and it’s difficult to imagine any appetite in Washington today for a substantial American reëntry into Iraq. But, with the militants nearing Baghdad, and the Iraqi Army faltering, President Obama will almost certainly feel compelled to act. Already, the U.S. has been rushing sophisticated weaponry to the Iraqi Army. The question now before the President is whether to take more significant steps, such as air strikes.

In Iraq, as in Syria, the choices are almost all bad, and the potential for American influence is limited. Syria appears to be headed toward an effective partition between predominantly Sunni and predominantly Alawite enclaves, and an impoverished, Somalia-like future where guns rule. In Iraq, the Kurds, the third big group, are taking advantage of the chaos by tightening their hold on Kirkuk and other disputed areas, in an effort to cement a future separate from that of the rest of Iraq. At the least, Iraq faces a future as a violent country, with a weak central government and many areas dominated by extremists. But things could get much worse than that.

Within a day after sweeping into Mosul, isis militants freed thousands of prisoners, looted bank vaults, and declared the imposition of Sharia law. From now on, the group said, unaccompanied women were to stay indoors, and thieves would be punished by amputation. The “divine conquest” of Mosul by a group of Islamic extremists is a bitter consequence of the American invasion. For now, there seems to be very little we can do about it.

I would also highly recommend perusing Ian Welsh's posts on his blog, which have been approaching the Iraq mess from several vantage points unknown to the Infotainment Snoozemedia and, apparently, to a whole lot of self-proclaimed policy experts.

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