WAIT, WAIT! CAN'T WE ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY AFTER THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS?

After all, we do know how to do war-crimes trials. That's Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, chief prosecutor at Nuremberg in 1945.

Most of my friends are probably admiring New Jersey and its Democratic governor and state legislature today. Even here in Asia people are aware-- and heartily approve-- of Governor Corzine signing a bill abolishing the death penalty in New Jersey. Back when I was at PS 197 in Brooklyn I won a U.N. scholarship for an essay I wrote defending the death penalty. I've moderated my bloodthirsty tendencies a bit since then... but just a bit.

To me the only thing that's inherently wrong with the death penalty is how dependably imperfect our justice system is in figuring out who should get it and who shouldn't. The justice system is fatally biased against minorities and against poor people. So, although I still consider myself a proponent of the death penalty, I don't think it should be implemented-- except in special cases.

Right now I'm reading Rajiv Chandrasekaran's stupendous best seller, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone. Anyone who needs a reason for exceptions to banning the death penalty need spend only a few hours contemplating the egregious war crimes committed by the Bush Regime and its lackeys in Iraq. For example, the Geneva Convention (and its predecessor, the Hague Convention of 1899; Article 43)-- as Bush Regime attorneys never tired of pointing out-- "required an occupying power to respect all the laws of the occupied country except when it is necessary to promote public order and safety." But right-wing ideologues the Bush Regime installed to run Iraq couldn't wait to impose the kind of vulture capitalism in Iraq they have been slowly imposing on America under the administrations of Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II. One dangerous nutcase Republican hack, Peter McPherson, immediately "slashed Iraq's top tax rate for individuals and businesses from 45% to a flat 15%. It was the sort of tax overhaul that fiscal conservatives long dreamed of implementing in the United States... The centerpiece of McPherson's agenda was a new foreign-investment law" whereby foreign companies could gobble up all of Iraq's natural resources and industries.

And there were far worse culprits than McPherson. He was replaced by Bush crony Thomas Foley, "an investment banker and a major Republican Party donor who had been President Bush's classmate at Harvard Business School."

A month after arriving, Foley [right] told a contractor from Bearing Point [a GOP-connected criminal consulting firm] that he intended to privatize all of Iraq's state-owned enterprises within thirty days.

"Tom, there are a couple of problems with that," the contractor said. "The first is an international law that prevents the sale of assets by an occupation government."

"I don't care about any of that stuff," Foley told the contractor, according to her recollection of the conversation. "I don't give a shit about international law. I made a commitment to the president that I'd privatize Iraq's businesses."

Imperial Life in the Emerald City reads like a blueprint for dismal and tragic failure in Iraq-- as though it was a premeditated objective. It is also a blueprint for how a Giuliani government would run-- I'll get more into that anon-- and it should be a blueprint for a thorough investigation by Congress. Hopefully, the worst of the criminals won't be indicted in New Jersey but in a state that knows how to punish real criminals... like Texas or Utah. Because despite the crocodile tears shed by the Republican Party's most effeminate presidential candidate, Mitt "I would never live in a pink house" Romney, these Republicans really do need to be punished for what they've done in Iraq-- for the sake of our national soul.


P.S.: KNOW YOUR U.S. PUBLIC SERVANTS--

THOMAS C. FOLEY

In June 2004, our Tom received the Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Award for his service as director of private-sector development for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. In 2006 he became U.S. ambassador to Ireland.

So that'll be "Mr. Ambassador" to you, girls and boys. Whatta guy!--Ken

#

From driving an ice cream truck to helping rebuild Iraq's Interior Ministry--an inside story of how monumentally U.S. civilians in Iraq screwed up

There's a pretty good reason why supporters of the Iraq war keep insisting we mustn't look back at the history of our current involvement there (although you'll notice that now that it's become a cliche that there's no good way out, they don't say so much that all that matters is: What do we do now?).

The reason why they don't want us looking back at how we got into the war and how the war and the occupation have been run is that everywhere you look, there are mountains of blame waiting to be apportioned. Not surprisingly, an ample portion of it belongs to those very people who don't want us looking back. (As Paul Krugman pointed out recently, why should we pay any attention to the thoughts on how to get out of the mess from the people who helped get us into it?)

Obviously this is one fundamental reason why it's so important that we do look back, and look back pretty closely. I have another reason, though. I often describe myself as "a nuts 'n' bolts kind of guy." Sure, I like to play with the big conceptual stuff too. But in the end I'm usually most intrigued by "facts on the ground"--i.e., how do/did things actually get done, or not?

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, now an assistant managing editor of the Washington Post, spent 18 months in Iraq reporting for the paper. He has written what sounds like a real "nuts 'n' bolts" kind of book, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone, focusing on the civilian occupation effort.

He was the guest on last night's Daily Show. Announcing this at the top of the show, Jon Stewart explained:

He is the author of the new book Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a blistering expose on The Wizard of Oz. No, actually it's about life in the Green Zone of Iraq, where our current exit strategy is also a fast clicking of our heels three times.

When interview time came, and Rajiv was brought out, Jon first held the book up.

JON STEWART: The book is called Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone.

The Americans had a plan when they toppled Saddam Hussein: to take over an area inside Baghdad, wall it off, and to operate the country from inside that bunker. How could that fail to work?

RAJIV CHANDRASEKARAN [laughing]: It was a brilliant plan, right? A seven-square-mile enclave, they could go in there, refill Saddam's swimming pools, set up some bars, a disco, a couple of Chinese restaurants, a cafe, a gymnasium. They'd have Bible study classes, salsa dancing classes. To get around, Halliburton would bring in dozens of Suburbans so they could drive around. Perfect plan.

JON: It seemed like something from Dr. Strangelove, what you describe, this idea of . . . there was this sort of Little America, but not even Little America, sort of like this eccentric city that had no . . . it was like a floating crap game. How did they insulate themselves in that way? Why did they insulate themselves in that way?

RAJIV: They wanted all the comforts of home. You know, Iraq was the big bad world on the outside, and they felt that they were going to this strange place--in fact, half of the people who went to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority, they had to apply for their first passport in order to go to Iraq. And so these guys hadn't been out and about in the world, and so they wanted a little bit of down-home cooking, down-home recreation.

JON: You write this incredible story of the guys who were going to rebuild some infrastructure. They brought three guys. The Germans had accomplished the same task in East Germany, and how many guys did they bring again?

RAJIV: 8000.

JON: Does that speak to the Germans' laziness?

RAJIV: Yes, you know the Germans aren't a very efficient people. They're bloated. We're efficient. We're lean, mean Americans. We're going to do a job that those Germans can do with 8000 with three guys.

JON: How could we be criminally wrong for that long? And it's out in book after book after book, documentation. Why is Halliburton allowed to continue there? Why was the Coalition Provisional Authority allowed to continue there? You write about, in job interviews people were asked who they voted for . . .

RAJIV: It was a real political litmus test. You would have thought, given the challenges of trying to get Iraq back up on its feet, we would have sent the best and the brightest. We sent the loyal and the willing, instead of getting people who were Arabic speakers, or people who had some experience in the Middle East, or in post-conflict reconstruction. Instead they wanted good, loyal Republicans.

So they scoured Republican offices on Capitol Hill, conservative think tanks, and just to make sure that they got them, in the interviews at the Pentagon before they went over, people were asked, "Did you vote for George W. Bush in the 2000 election?" "Are you a member of the Republican Party?" And some, as I detail in the book, were even asked for their views on things like Roe vs. Wade.

JON: I have to tell you, I've read a lot of these books, and I am typically shocked at what I see. This one in particular is Through the Looking Glass. Although my only guess is that they're just over there building a culture of life.

RAJIV: We want life, not death, in Iraq. Maybe that's the prescription for success.

JON: Exactly.

Is this where it all went wrong?

RAJIV: I think this is a big reason it went wrong. You know, we know so well now the disastrous consequences of failing to send enough troops--to protect Iraq, to prevent the looting, to deal with the insurgency in those early months.

What I write in this book is that there was a whole other set of mistakes that were made that are just as responsible for getting us into the mess that we find ourselves in today. And those were the goofs, the mistakes made by the American civilians, who ensconced themselves inside this bubble in the Green Zone.

JON: Who were the adults that were there? Were there adults there? Was it Lord of the Flies? Not even Lord of the Flies . . .

RAJIV: We've gone from extremes. We had these 20-year-old kids in Baghdad, and now we have the octogenarians of the Iraq Study Group helping to lead us along. But you know, seriously, we sent a 24-year-old kid out there who had never worked in the financial industry in this country--out there to reopen the Stock Exchange. We sent a 21-year-old kid who hadn't even graduated from college to join the team rebuilding Iraq's Interior Ministry. I don't have to tell you how important that is. The guy boasted to an interviewer that his most meaningful job before going to Baghdad was as an ice cream truck driver. We took a guy . . .

JON: I do have to take exception here. Everyone does love ice cream.

RAJIV: Iraq's a hot country. Ice cream might have won some hearts and minds.

JON: Have you been able to come down from this? I can see even now your passion and your anger.

RAJIV: Well, you know, this book has been an attempt at some personal closure, from what I witnessed out there 18 months as a reporter for the Washington Post. It was a story there that I felt hadn't been told that I really wanted to get out there, and I think it's important that the American people understand this stuff.