Trump Seems Completely Determined To Let The Banksters Rape And Pillage America Again

Damian Paletta is the Washington Post's White House economic policy reporter and before we get into the much-discussed piece he wrote over the weekend, How regulators, Republicans and big banks fought for a big increase in lucrative but risky corporate loans, let's look at which current members of Congress have taken the most in bribes from the Finance Sector. Since 1990, that sector has pumped $2,805,307,780 into congressional elections, over and above the massive sums spent on presidential campaigns. They spent $1,549,196,835 bribing Republicans and $1,239,551,817 bribing Democrats. Counting only members who are still serving in Congress this dozen from each house can be considered the most corrupt men and women in our legislative branch. If all were in prison tomorrow, America would be a much better place very quickly. First the Senate:

• Mitt Romney (R-UT)- $81,834,111
• Chuck Schumer (D-NY)- $26,901,212
• Marco Rubio (R-FL)- $13,757,755
• Mitch McConnell (R-KY)- $12,953,133
• Ted Cruz (R-TX)- $11,268,146
• Rob Portman (R-OH)- $11,026,133
• Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)- $9,985,657
• Pat Toomey (R-PA)- $9,822,497
• Bob Menendez (D-NJ)- $9,442,669
• John Cornyn (R-TX)- $9,419,544
• Mark Warner (D-VA)- $9,133,431
• Richard Shelby (R-AL)- $8,315,554

And now the dozen worst still serving in the House of Representatives:

• Kevin McCarthy (R-CA)- $8,086,692
• Steny Hoyer (D-MD)- $6,865,814
• Jim Himes (New Dem-CT)- $6,376,379
• Carolyn Maloney (D-NY)- $6,309,318
• Patrick McHenry (R-NC)- $5,627,242
• Steve Stivers (R-OH)- $5,620,077
• Richard Neal (D-MA)- $5,527,960
• Nita Lowey (D-NY)- $5,249,506
• Kevin Brady (R-TX)- $4,207,385
• Ed Perlmutter (New Dem-CO)- $4,121,168
• Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)- $4,072,569
• John Larson (D-CT)- $3,966,959

You could say this money means the banksters control much of the government and you wouldn't be off the mark. In fact, Bernie did say something like it:

Now, this is what Damian Paletta had to say in the article I was referring to: "Actions by federal regulators and Republicans in Congress over the past two years have paved the way for banks and other financial companies to issue more than $1 trillion in risky corporate loans, sparking fears that Washington and Wall Street are repeating the mistakes made before the financial crisis. The moves undercut policies put in place by banking regulators six years ago that aimed to prevent high-risk lending from once again damaging the economy." And he's right. But, to be strictly fair, it isn't only the Republicans. It's all the Republicans and a shamefully growing number of corporate-oriented Democrats behind all this. The Republican wing of the Democratic Party-- the New Dems, Blue Dogs, Problem Solver Caucus-- are all in this together.

"Now," Paletta continued, "regulators and even White House officials are struggling to comprehend the scope and potential dangers of the massive pool of credits, known as leveraged loans, they helped create. Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America and other financial companies have originated these loans to hundreds of cash-strapped companies, many of which could be unable to repay if the economy slows or interest rates rise. 'This means that the next downturn that we have could be more serious and longer-lasting and more difficult to deal with than it would have been if we had constrained these practices,' former Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen said in an interview."

Of the men and women running for president one has proven utterly incapable of-- and uninterested in-- dealing with this: Trump. Two have careers that prove the opposite-- that they are eager to take on the problems and solve them systemically: Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. [A Bernie and Liz ticket is just what the doctor ordered.] The rest of the candidates are... just running or president because... why not? Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Paletta wrote that in 2011, two years after the end of the financial crisis, Timothy Long, chief national bank examiner at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and a seasoned bank examiner saw a worrying trend that caused him to issue warnings to other examiners to keep their guard up and prevent greedy banks, which charge huge fees for taking on these risks, from taking on too much risk, with this type of corporate credit called leveraged lending. The risk is inherent because the loans are "made to borrowers who have access to less cash than others, and who tend to fall behind on payments with greater frequency when interest rates go up or the economy slows down."

In 2013, two years after Long retired, the OCC joined with the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the main banking regulators, to issue formal "guidance" meant to steer banks away from the riskiest of these loans, cementing Long's warning into a firmer policy. Guidance isn't the same as an order. But "in a report the next year, regulators revealed 'serious deficiencies' in the way that leveraged loans were offered by banks. It found 31 percent of the loans offered by banks during the previous 12 months were considered 'weak,' meaning they are poorly executed and at a high risk of default. It also found that 75 percent of all the banking industry's substandard assets were leveraged loans. Credit Suisse was one of the worst culprits. Paletta reported that "This new regulatory push sent shudders through the banking industry. Financial companies dialed back their leveraged lending, according to industry data. Issuance of these loans fell from $607 billion in 2013 to $423 billion in 2015, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence. Private equity firms complained that it was harder to obtain loans for leveraged buyouts. Bankers, upset about losing out on millions of dollars in fees, started complaining to regulators and congressional aides that regulatory 'guidance' should not dictate how banks do business."

Paletta continued, explaining that "Before the 2016 election, bankers told regulators and congressional aides that their banks simply wanted to originate the loans and then sell the risk off to investors, such as insurance companies and mutual funds. Bankers argued that even if the loans were risky, the federally insured banks would not stand to lose if the loans went south because they had sold the products on to others, according to five banking industry executives involved in the discussions." The bad guys here: a trade association called the Clearing House Association (now called the Bank Policy Institute), whose members include JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Bank of America.

The lending boom was precipitated, in part, by the rush to water down regulations at the start of the Trump administration. That's when newly minted regulators-- many with close ties to the financial industry-- sought to strip away post-crisis financial rules and find ways to juice the economy by encouraging more lending.

One of their top targets was leveraged loans. These are giant loans that banks make to heavily indebted-- in financial speak, highly leveraged-- companies. Bankers often have little assurance that the loans can be repaid, which can make them particularly risky. Bankers earn large fees off these products, and many banking executives say their institutions are sheltered from losses because they sell the loans to other investors such as hedge funds, mutual funds and insurance companies.

By freeing banks to make more of these loans, regulators allowed more money to be pumped into the economy. White House officials believe this helped achieve President Donald Trump's goal of growing the economy faster in the first half of his term.

...This tension between easy money and unknown risks has flummoxed some of the very officials who have allowed the lending binge to heat up since 2017. In an appendix to its annual budget, White House officials in March touched on both the benefit of leveraged loans and the potential that they could cause a repeat of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.

"Lending has increased, which is a positive development, but care must be taken that excessive leverage and risk do not reprise the mistakes of the 2000s," the report said.

...In March 2017, two months after Trump's inauguration, Sen. Patrick Toomey (R-PA) sent a letter to the Government Accountability Office asking for a legal ruling on whether the 2013 guidance should have been classified as a "rule."

This designation mattered because Congress has the ability to repeal a "rule" with a majority vote, and Republicans in Congress were moving swiftly to nullify multiple regulations with this tactic.

Toomey is one of the Senate's top voices calling for more banking deregulation, and 10 of his 17 biggest campaign contributors are financial company officials.

Also note above that Toomey has taken close to $10 million in legalistically permissible bribes, among the most of anyone who has ever served in Congress. Toomey has always been a dirt-bag and a crook, from his earliest days in politics. In the House he served on the Budget Committee. Today, in the Senate, he serves on 4 committees. See if you can discern any commonalities: the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs where he is the chair of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection and serves on the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment; Budget Committee; Finance Committee; and Joint Economic Committee. Those bribes he gets are not random. Bank lobbyists know exactly how to target their "contributions." When Paletta interviewed him, Toomey claimed he hasn't been "approached by any financial company about the leveraged-lending issue. Instead, he said his aides identified it as a glaring example of the type of regulatory overreach he had long fought to curb. 'It comes, first of all, in the context of a broader effort on my part to diminish the... near omnipotence of some regulators and restore legislative authority to where it belongs, which is Congress,' Toomey said."

Less than two months later, Trump replaced Thomas Curry, appointed by President Barack Obama to lead the OCC, with banking attorney Keith Noreika.

In June 2017, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin issued a 149-page report calling for changes to the way financial companies are overseen by the government. Among them, Treasury's report said banks found the guidance confusing, which was one reason they had cut back on these loans.

Treasury urged the agencies to effectively suspend the guidance and issue it again, this time seeking more feedback from banks. These loans were key to helping the economy grow and extending credit to companies that might not otherwise have access to it, the Treasury report said. Treasury officials met with bankers and others as they prepared to write the report, though it is unclear what their role was in having input into the final language.

In October 2017, the GAO issued a report saying the 2013 "guidance" should have been issued in a more formal way, a position that raised the possibility of invalidating the regulators' power.

The next month, Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO) then-chairman of the House subcommittee on financial institutions and consumer credit, sent a letter to the regulators asking for assurances that they would not be enforcing the leveraged-lending guidance. [NOTE: Luetkemeyer is a total Wall Street whore, since being elected to Congress in 2008, he's been on the House Financial Services Committee which he's used as a perch to do the bidding of Wall Street banksters and to collect $3,788,703 in bribes-- remember, just since 2008-- to finance his revoltingly corrupt and destructive political career.]

A few days later, Noreika told the Wall Street Journal that the leveraged-lending guidelines "shouldn't be binding on anyone." Noreika, who has returned to the private sector and advises financial companies, among others, declined to comment.

The floodgates were only beginning to open.

Noreika's replacement at the OCC was Joseph Otting, a financial executive and former colleague of Mnuchin. In early 2018, Otting told an investor conference in Las Vegas that banks, in terms of leveraged loans, "have the right to do what you want as long as it does not impair safety and soundness. It's not our position to challenge that."

He remarked on all the tightening that took place after the 2013 guidance came out: "It was like people were afraid to jump over the line without feeling the wrath of Khan from the regulators," he said, according to a Reuters report at the time.

The comments stunned some regulators at other banking agencies, as they had become concerned watching bankers dive back into the high-risk corporate lending business, according to two people involved in the discussions, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to reveal internal agency deliberations.

Long, the former top official at the OCC, said he and many of his former colleagues believe that, with the U.S. economy entering its 10th year of growth, it is only a matter of time before a downturn begins and many of these loans unravel. When companies default on their loans, bankers often retrench and won't lend as freely, worried about extending money to other companies that could also default. This can quickly affect the broader economy, leading to layoffs and bankruptcies, and halting new investment.

"We are in the eighth year of a seven-year credit cycle," he said. "When things turn, they are going to turn hard."

As regulators scaled back scrutiny, bankers began to binge.

Financial companies issued a total of $1.271 trillion in leveraged loans in 2017 and 2018, 40 percent more than in 2015 and 2016, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence. More than 80 percent of the loans made in 2018 were made with fewer restrictions on the borrower and fewer protections for the lender in the event the loan falls into default.

These loans are often central elements of the leveraged buyouts private equity companies perform when they take over a struggling company at risk of collapse.

In the past few years, household names like J. Crew, PetSmart, Neiman Marcus, Buffalo Wild Wings and Nine West have all been restructured with leveraged loans. There are hundreds of other cases, including energy and health-care companies, many of which received multibillion-dollar loans from a consortium of banks and other lenders.

Asked about the company's exposure to leverage loans, JPMorgan Chase chief executive Jamie Dimon told analysts in January that banks are much more resilient-- and smarter-- than they were 10 years ago. He acknowledged that some financial companies, particularly those that are not banks, could lose money during a recession because of these products, but he expected the impact would be contained.

"Someone's going to get hurt there," he said.

Bank of America chief executive Brian Moynihan had a similar take in the earnings call for his company that month. He said his company makes a number of these loans but sells them off immediately-- an indication that they do not hold any of the risk on their balance sheet.

"We market and move them out, and it's gone," he said.

One reason bankers have been able to make so many of these higher-risk loans without regulatory interference is that they sell these products on to outside investors. The loans are packaged into products known as collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs.

The CLO market has surged in the past 10 years, growing from $300 billion at the end of 2008 to $615 billion at the end of 2018, but the quality of these products is worse than it was before the financial crisis, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Some former regulators have noted an eerie parallel between the subprime mortgage crisis and the leveraged-loan buildup. In the 2000s, banks and other finance companies took risky loans-- certain mortgages-- and packaged them into products that were sold off to investors. Financial companies also made other exotic instruments, known as collateralized debt obligations, tied to those securities. The products entangled financial companies with one another, allowing weak institutions to pull down stronger institutions when the value of these products cratered.

Today, regulators say they don't have a firm grip on what the impact will be when the economy weakens or enters a recession.

"We're doing a lot of work in this area, trying to understand the risk better," said Bob Phelps, the OCC's deputy comptroller for supervision risk management. "How this will play out... is really hard to figure out."

The recent reluctance to crack down on leveraged lending is part of a broader regulatory walkback.

Officials at the Fed, which is charged with spotting risks posed by large financial institutions to the financial system and broader economy, announced plans in March to scale back the process they use to monitor the way large banks weather a recession. Officials said banks had made improvements in how they prepared for the next downturn. Lael Brainard, a member of the Fed's Board of Governors and an Obama-era appointee, was the only Fed official to vote against the move. The others who voted for it were appointed by Trump.

In November, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) pressed Randal Quarles, the Fed's vice chairman for bank supervision, on whether regulators were doing enough to address the record levels of leveraged loans. She asked why the 2013 guidance was not being monitored as it had been five years ago.

Quarles said the Fed was more appropriately focused on whether banks posed a risk to the financial system.

"We are monitoring compliance with safety and soundness," Quarles responded. "We should not monitor compliance with guidance."

He stressed, however, that the Fed and other regulators were monitoring the risks leveraged loans could pose, though he did not offer any assessments.

"We are actually quite athletically looking at that," he said, without explaining what he meant.

Having made substantial progress in pushing regulators to soften scrutiny of leveraged loans, the banking industry is continuing to expand its influence.

Last year, partly at the urging of Powell, the White House nominated economist and financial-regulation expert Nellie Liang to the central bank's Board of Governors.

Her nomination from the White House was exceptional, in that she does not have a banking background and previously worked at the Fed to fine-tune oversight of financial companies. She formerly directed the Federal Reserve's Office of Financial Stability, one of its most powerful components.

Banking industry lobbyists whipped up opposition to Liang, persuading some Republicans on the Senate Banking Committee to block her confirmation, according to five people involved in the process. In January, she announced she was withdrawing from consideration after it became clear she could not win Senate confirmation.

Trump then went in a much different direction and announced his intent to nominate two big political supporters, Herman Cain and Stephen Moore, to open seats at the Fed. Neither has commented on leveraged lending, but both are big proponents of stripping back regulations and have called for immediate steps to make the economy grow even faster.

You want the short version? Like something you might get at Axios? Trump's "booming" economy-- for some-- is built on a foundation of sands-- these ultra-risky loans, a trillion dollars worth-- that could come toppling down if there's any jolt to the system. Jolt to the system? With Trump in change? The congressional Republicans-- and the New Dems and Blue Dogs who constitute the Republican wing of the Democratic Party-- have been all in on delivering for the banksters who delivered for them. This kind of legalistic bribery can only lead to catastrophe for someone-- generally speaking, the rest of us. We have an economy built on high risk and rampant corruption. I guess I could have put that up top, but now you know more than anyone else you're likely to talk to about this in the next week or two.

"Leverage" spoiler alert: The show goes out on a high note, imagining a lovely conspiracy of the world's overprivileged elites

The Leverage team: Nate (Timothy Hutton), Sophie (Gina Bellman), Eliot (Christian Kane), Hardison (Aldis Hodge), and Parker (Beth Riesgraf)

"The world's economy would never stabilize with endless parades of bankers being led around in chains. The system has to work. The guys who used to run it have to keep running it."

-- Interpol agent James Sterling (Mark A. Sheppard), in last
night's final episode of Leverage, "The Long Good-bye Job"

"Leverage was one of the few shows that pointed out how outmatched individuals are by profit-obsessed corporations. In its last season the show tackled pro sport's concussion problem, weak occupational-safety laws, how the rapacious policies of big box stores threaten small towns, and the inadequacy of consumer-protection regulations in the toy market—among many other little-guy-versus-the-world story lines. The show also reminded viewers of the similarities between scam artists and marketers. Did you think they'd be allowed to get away with that forever?"

-- Slate "Browbeat" culture columnist June Thomas

by Ken

I'm sure you remember the Obama administration's storied preference for "looking forward" over sifting through the wreckage of the economic meltdown with a view to bringing any malefactors to justice. In last night's Christmas finale of TNT's Leverage, we were treated to a wonderfully wacky but delicious image of that refusal to prosecute.

During the week I'd heard the Christmas episode of Leverage promoted as both the season finale and the series finale. It turns out, as of last Friday, that "series finale" is correct.

After watching the episode (about which more in a moment), I've learned from Slate's "Browbeat" culture blogger June Thomas that showrunner Dean Devlin explained in an open letter to fans earlier this month that, amid uncertainty about renewal for a sixth season, and facing the departures of star Timothy Hutton (as scam-team mastermind Nate Ford) and Gina Bellman (as the ever-mysterious grifter Sophie Devereaux), decided with series co-creator (with Chris Downey) John Rogers decided to end Season 5 --

with the episode we had planned to make to end the series, way back when we shot the pilot.  So, the episode that will air on Christmas is, in fact, the series finale we had always envisioned.

You could see from the end of the episode that it left open the possibility of a Closer-to-Major Cases-type afterlife-conversion, but on Friday, as I noted, the hammer was dropped.

I like June Thomas's take, grieving first for all those people put out of work. I suspect I'll miss the show, which she points out "was all about sticking up for the rights of the little guy against powerful corporate and governmental interests," less than she will, but I take her point about it, which I've put at the top of this post.

And I have to give the show folk credit for going out in a blaze of glory, with Nate secretly bamboozling the team into a mission that turns out to be the capture of a government computer file he calls the Black Book. When the heist appears to have gone catastrophically wrong, he's interrogated by an Interpol agent and her superior, a long-time nemesis of Nate's.

INTERPOL AGENT CASEY (Catherine Dent): What is the Black Box?
NATE: Five years ago, when the financial system crashed, the FBI, SEC, IRS, Interpol -- they all did their jobs. They investigated, and they found massive fraud. Market manipulation, secret deals, pension funds loaded with bogus paper, people's life savings burnt. And because they knew they'd broken the system, well, they were too powerful -- they got all the money out. Now you think I'm a thief, Agent Casey? One-third of the world's entire wealth disappeared then. Biggest heist in history. And we know who did it.
INTERPOL (HIGHER-UP) AGENT STERLING (Mark A. Sheppard): We decided not to prosecute. Order had to be restored.
NATE: That's why you joined Interpol? Screw justice, you're the order guy?
AGENT STERLING: It's not a choice.
NATE: It is. Justice, or order? One day you are going to have to make that choice.
AGENT STERLING: The world's economy would never stabilize with endless parades of bankers being led around in chains. The system has to work. The guys who used to run it have to keep running it.
NATE: Government agencies -- they closed all the cases. They took all the files of all the cases they could have prosecuted, all the savings accounts with all the stolen money, and they filed it away. That file . . . is the Black Book.
AGENT STERLING: The Holy Grail of the ones who got away with it.

"The ones who got away with it." I like that. (By the way, in the end Agent Sterling did indeed make his choice, and it probably wasn't the one most of us would have expected.)

#

At its best, Leverage is better than just watchable

This official TNT season-two preview gives some of the flavor of the Leverage gang. Three episodes from season two remain to air Wednesday nights (including tonight) at 10pm ET/PT, repeated at 1am.

by Ken

No, Leverage isn't one of my favorite shows. Episodes tend to pile up on my DVR and then get watched in bulk when I need to clear space. Note, however, that I could just delete them. The show is competently crafted and eminently watchable. The reason I commend it to your attention is that now and then -- as in a couple of the most recently shown episodes -- it shows flashes of something more.

It's a scam-slash-caper show, though nowhere near as stylish or individual as AMC's Hustle. The hook is that this gang led by former insurance investigator Nate Ford (Timothy Hutton) isn't in it for the loot; it's out to right wrongs committed against people with no recourse. Think A Team folded into Hustle with the ghost of Mission: Impossible hovering over. As with the TNT show with which it's been regularly paired until now, the dark but not terribly believable undercover-cop drama Dark Blue, it is, as I say, eminently watchable, but generally unmemorable -- the viewer is left too much leisure to recall how good Timothy Hutton was as Archie Goodwin in the Nero Wolfe mysteries and how good Dylan McDermott was as Bobby on The Practice.

You can see that creator-producers Dean Devlin, Chris Downey, and John Rogers have worked hard to build an array of complexities and complications and quirks into each of the characters. We've got Nate's strangely self-destructive drinking and inability to relate humanly to much of anybody, including the gang's scam mistress Sophie (Gina Bellman, probably best known to most of us as Jane the ditzy nymphomaniac from the British series Coupling), who is frustratingly unable to rouse any romantic interest from him. Then there's Eliot (Christian Kane), the bull-headed but boyishly charming martial-arts banger (try not to think of Mr. T); and Hardison (Aldis Hodge), the electronics and computer wizard who constantly winds up doing other things he's not so good at; and Parker (Beth Riesgraf), the safecracker-daredevil who, judging from what I read online, seems to be a lot of viewers' favorite.

For the later episodes of this season Sophie, having withdrawn from the gang presumably out of frustration over Nate's nonresponsiveness, offers them as designated scam babe (doesn't every gang of scammers have to have a scam babe?) her much more businesslike friend Tara (Jeri Ryan), who has difficulty finding her place in the group. The mystery turns out to be easily explained: Gina Bellman was having a baby! Latest word is that she will be ready to go for season three.

This is all fine as far as it goes, but it doesn't go all that far. The nonreactive chemistry between Nate and Sophie doesn't make for vivid drama, and in fact with most of the characters we get more biographical facts than real human dimension. TNT's slogan is "We know drama" (based, apparently, on its business acumen in shelling out the bucks to wrest Law & Order away from A&E), but USA's emphasis on "character" seems to me why it's been producing so much high-quality TV drama in recent years. (That said, TNT has to be credited with two unqualified series triumphs: the enchanting comedy My Boys, about a vividly created band of Chicago 20-somethings that more or less centers around a female sportswriter P. J. Franklin (the hopelessly beguiling Jordana Spiro, pictured here), and the policier-cum-family soap-cum-theological-angel-apparition-drama Saving Grace, with Holly Hunter always amazing as Grace, and a strong cast around her.)

So what gives me heart? For one thing, I'm noticing in the more recent episodes -- maybe it was there in the earlier ones, but I'm just noticing it now -- how funny Hardison can be, especially when he bitches about the total nonrecognition he gets for the prodigies he performs routinely sitting at his computer keyboard. His colleagues hardly seem him doing anything, and of course haven't the slightest clue how he does it.

My favorite moment: Hardison, listening in to the audio feed from the others in the bar downstairs, hears that in order to prevent their mark from making his way to the airport and leaving the country, they need a weather report that will persuade him the snow is so severe, his plane can't possibly leave, keeping him in the bar. He proceeds to improvise, singlehandedly and in a matter of a few minutes, a slightly goofy but just believable enough weather report, which he's already hacked to feed into the bar's TV.

That episode, "The Bottle Job," as a whole is another of my "signs of hope." Nate found himself trying to save the bar in which he had more or less grown up, the de facto "office" of his father, who turns out to have been a ruthless loan shark. Timothy Hutton isn't really a good enough actor to be a convincing "man of mystery." Spelling out some of those mysteries was a terrific idea; finally the character began taking on some involving dimension.

This was even more true in last week's episode, "The Zanzibar Marketplace Job," where the gang finds itself in Ukraine on what becomes a personal mission for Nate: rescuing his wrongfully arrested ex-wife Maggie. In a brilliant way, the presentation of Maggie filled in a huge gap in Nate's personality. The bumbling, the drinking, the human unreachableness -- it's all explained by the simple reality that the poor guy is still hopelessly in love with her. Someone had the inspiration to cast the fascinating Kari Matchett (it's a shame somebody thought she had to be blondified, though [UPDATE: expert commenters inform us that Kari's a natural blond; see the comments]), who was the leading lady of the Canadian repertory company with whom Hutton did all those Nero Wolfe shows -- they're really quite wonderful together. Here, although badly out of sync, is a sample: