Monday, May 14, 2018

Should Party Leaders (And Schlemiel DCCC Staffers) Pick The Party's Candidates Or Should Local Democrats Decide?

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Even though Bob Borosage is a Beltway person, he's a very smart guy. I know him from our work at the Progressive Majority Political Action Committee and I noticed that he always knew what he was talking about. He's a contributing editor at The Nation and he does an excellent job there. On Friday they published a piece by him, Why Primary Fights Are Good for the Democratic Party, that I'm hoping DCCC staffers decide to read. It's about them and the miserable disservice they are doing to the party, to the country and to democracy itself. "The DCCC," he writes, "shouldn't be pushing activists aside in key races." That tactic is only one that they've been using since Pelosi named Rahm Emanuel chair of the committee in 2006, to turn the Democratic House Conference away from progressivism and towards corruption.

Stenchy Hoyer, a very tired Pelosi, Joe Crowley, Ben Ray Luján and a raft of grotesquely and institutionally corrupt staffers, fanatically project a status quo that has been catastrophic for the Democrats and left them in a position where they can only win elections in wave cycles. in other words, they have to sit aroud waiting for the Republicans to screw up badly enough to win House majorities. The only operational strategy the DCCC has had in over a decade is... we're the lesser evil. They literally floated an idea recently that when something like this: "If you think we're bad, take a look at the other guys." Someone talked them out of it.

I actually found it. This isn't photo-shopped. DCCC staffers floated it

Too bad no one talked them out of savagely attacking Democratic candidates Laura Moser (TX-07), Levi Tillemann (CO-06) and Andy Thorburn (CA-39), each on behalf of demonstrably far more conservative candidates. Look at the trash they sent me to get out about poor Hans Keirstead (CA-48) yesterday. Pelosi, who has been losing control of her own faculties in recent years, even admitted the DCCC won't help legitimate Democratic candidates unless the DCCC approves of them.


We've gone over this again and again. Borosage's angle though was to point of right-of-center establishment journalists who defend the DCCC's position. Her wrote that "In separate op-eds, Jonathan Alter and longtime Democratic operative Elaine Kamarck argued that DCCC interference is essential if Democrats are to recapture a House majority in the fall. Both applauded the citizen mobilizations that could help generate a 'wave election,' but essentially want activists to line up, salute, and let the pros take care of candidate selection. They couldn’t be more wrong."And Borosage couldn't be more correct.
Alter’s argument is the more scabrous; it accused “remnants of lefties in Jill Steinland” of “moral vanity” for “indulging” in primary fights that drain resources over “minor policy differences.” (He didn’t bother to explain why a primary challenger is equivalent to a third-party candidate.) Alter fretted that more progressive candidates might actually beat “well-funded moderates with better chances of winning in November.” In this most important election, Democrats should put party and country over “personal preference,” he argued, and resist voting for the candidate whose views they support, and instead favor the one more likely to win in the general election. Built into this argument is the unquestioned assumption that the DCCC is best qualified to identify the right candidate.

Kamarck, an early champion of the New Democrats and a longtime DNC member, echoed Alter’s faith in the pros. She expressed regrets that the party has allowed candidates to be selected by voters in primaries rather than party officials in back rooms: She wants more, rather than fewer, superdelegates to help determine the party’s presidential nominee. The DCCC, she admitted, is “not always right,” but it is more concerned about “electability than ideological purity.” In her view, voters don’t understand that “not all congressional districts are Berkeley, California.“

It’s hard to be a weatherman if you can’t tell which way the wind is blowing. Alter and Kamarck have summarized the beliefs of a party establishment that doesn’t have a clue.



Even in traditional political terms, the argument is unconvincing. It doesn’t consider the Democratic establishment’s record of abysmal failure. Over the past decade, Democrats lost control of both houses of Congress, 1,000 seats in statehouses across the nation, and the presidency to the most reviled candidate in history. The party committees haven’t cleaned house or changed strategy. The same consultants, the same pollsters, the same operatives still are at the wheel. If they were mechanics, you would not keep hiring them to fix your car.

The DCCC’s strategy to pursue bland, “safe” candidates is particularly questionable in an off-year election; midterms are often marked by low turnout. Activist energy and base mobilization are critical. Democrats are talking about a wave election because the resistance to Trump is combining with momentum from the Sanders campaign along with movements like #MeToo and Black Lives Matter.

Candidates can help fuel that energy or depress it. The DCCC’s screen for candidates starts with those who can give or raise a lot of money. It favors “moderates” who might appeal to the center-- thus there is a preference for veterans and ex–intelligence officers, businesspeople and corporate lawyers, even for former Republicans. The theory goes that Trump will naturally mobilize the Democratic base to vote, and moderate candidates will have a better chance to attract independents.

But voters right, left, and center are increasingly suspicious of traditionally packaged, blow-dried candidates. Voters are looking for authentic leaders who will shake things up. The DCCC’s business-as-usual approach is increasingly out of step with the times.

Primary fights can help build energy, interest, and mobilization-- or they can be divisive. Part of that depends on how challengers are treated by the establishment. The DCCC’s heavy thumb on the scale-- particularly in the wake of the revelations about the DNC’s machinations in the 2016 presidential primaries-- is increasingly likely to backfire. When the DCCC unleashed a personal attack on Laura Moser in a Texas congressional race, the popular reaction in fund-raising and activism surely helped propel her into a runoff against the DCCC’s designated candidate. Worse, DCCC interference may well end up leaving activists embittered, which saps energy for the general election.

Alter believes there is a limited pool of money and energy that primaries needlessly squander. But energy and money in politics are a function of excitement and interest. Primary challenges-- particularly substantive ones-- can help build energy, capture interest, and generate more resources.
One of the worst of the DCCC candidates this cycle, a sure thing, was Jay Hulings in south Texas. He was endorsed by the DCCC, the Castro Machine, the Blue Dogs and the New Dems. Despite spending $554,903, Hulings was beaten in the first round of the primary by a Berniecrat who spent less than $30,000. Hulings, a slick attorney with virtually no connection to south Texas and with nothing to offer the people who live there but a list of endorsements from groups no one trusts, came in fourth.

And the DCCC's ruthless attacks against Laura Moser in the Houston area helped her raise around $100,000 in just a few days and catapulted her into into the May 22nd runoff over the head of the DCCC-preferred bland centrist Alex Triantaphyllis, who, like Hulings, came in an embarrassing fourth.

About a year ago the DCCC regional vice chair whose responsibility included Texas and Colorado, resigned. Pelosi and Luján pledged to replace him. They haven't, which has allowed DCCC political director Jason Bresler, widely considered one of the stupidest political operative in Washington, to call all the shots in the region. Every shot he's called has been disastrous.

There are countless districts in every part of the country where DCCC interference in primaries-- basically always on behalf of more conservative and more corrupt candidates-- has been a down right catastrophe. Here are the dozen worst, all but the 2 in North Carolina, still to come:
Ann Kirkpatrick (New Dem-AZ)
Gil "McSwampy" Cisneros (CA)
Jason Crow (New Dem-CO)
Paul Davis (Blue Dog-KS)
Gretchen Driskell (Blue Dog-MI)
Elissa Slotkin (New Dem-MI)
Dan McCready (Blue Dog-NC)
Kathy Manning (New Dem-NC)
Brad Ashford (Blue Dog-NE)
Jeff Van Drew (NRA-NJ)
Anthony Brindisi (Blue Dog-NY)
Ben McAdams (Blue Dog-UT)

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Tuesday, February 04, 2014

Has "Sling-Bob" Gates ALWAYS gotten it wrong?

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A quick show of hands: How many of you out there would let "Dr. Gates" so much as look at, let alone touch, your tonsils?

"This combination of elfish charm and sub-par performance goes back a long way."
-- Jonathan Alter, in "The Wars Robert
Gates Got Wrong
," on newyorker.com

by Ken

As we prepare to talk again about Robert "Sling-Bob" Gates, the former director of Central Intelligence and (under both R and D prezzes) secretary of defense, we should perhaps do a quick-refresher quiz on the circumstances under which Sling-Bob made his return to gummint service in 2006, as successor to term-and-a-half Bush-regime Defense Secretary Donald "O Yeah? You and Who Else Is Gonna Indict Me?" Rumsfeld.
A DWT QUIZ: BACK WHEN SLING-BOB
REPLACED OLD RUMMY AS SECDEF . . .


Let's say that, hypothetically, you have just been named to a job that was until recently infested by Donald "O Yeah? You and Who Else Is Gonna Indict Me?" Rumsfeld. Perhaps a job more or less like secretary of defense. The general response to your appointment, even if nothing more is known about you, is most likely to be:

(a) "We're sure going to miss Old Rummy."

(b) "Sure, Old Rummy was a pain in the butt, but we have to hope the new guy keeps all those splendid reforms he made at the Pentagon."

(c) "Look, Rummy's a close personal friend, but as long as the new guy isn't a known crackhead, he's a step up. I wouldn't put Old Rummy in charge of a school bake sale."

(d) "Ding-dong, Old Rummy's gone!"

ANSWER: Wouldn't you like to know?
A couple of weeks into the hubbub over the advance publicity about the terible things that Sling-Bob says in his new book about President Obama and Vice President Biden (and at least in the advance publicity no one else, though apparently there are other folks who have bad things said about them in the actual book), I raised the question: "Why on earth would anyone pay any attention to Village hack Bob Gates? (Just 'cause he wrote some crummy book?)" And I suggested that a lot of the "respect" accorded Sling-Bob's performance as defense secretary had to do with his being the "Unrummy."

Among other pungent things the highly respected Sling-Bob says, you'll surely recall, is that Vice President Biden has been "wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades wrong about every foreign-policy issue of the last 40 years."To which I would have thought the obvious response would be: "Boy, that butt-covering Sling-Bob sure is full of shit!"

That's even without factoring in the important reminder I cited from people who are more au courant than myself with the ins and outs of Sling-Bob's career. This would be his utter and complete fucking up of the most important question he ever faced in his many long decades of earnest public résumé-building: his savagely scornful dismissal of that Mikhail Gorbachev character as anything new or different in the way of Kremlin leadership. Sling-Bob's sliming emphatically enclosed those nutjob analysts who were saying that -- get this! -- the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse! (Now stop your laughing, boys and girls. Who could have known?)

In approaching Jonathan Alter's reporting, I always try to keep in mind how well plugged in JA is to the hearts and minds of Village people (who are not to be confused with the Village People, who at least provided a modicum of entertainment). So when Jonathan tells us that Sling-Bob is beloved of Village people of both the R and D (but especially the R) varieties, that he "was not a kiss-ass but one of the shrewdest public servants of his generation," well, it's a highly Village-compatible rendering.

To which we need to quickly add a reminder that popularity among Village people rarely has much to do with competence. For our Jonathan, it "helps to explain why [Sling-Bob's] many failures and missed calls have been all but air-brushed out of accounts of his career." Jonathan goes so far as to suggest that the famous "wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades" judgment, "as it happens . . . applies rather precisely to Gates himself."

"On first impression," says Jonathan, "Gates is unprepossessing: someone who worked closely with him compared his appearance to 'the guy at P. C. Richards who sold microwave ovens.' "
But upon his return to government in 2006, after a thirteen-year absence, colleagues and even people who had never met him began to think of him as oracular. His nickname in the Obama Administration was "Yoda." Cabinet colleagues, especially Hillary Clinton, who sought peace between State and Defense, listened to him with the ear-cupped deference of actors in the old ad for E. F. Hutton. And yet Gates's experience and wisdom failed to prevent the biggest breach between the President and the military since the Korean War. On Afghanistan, the most internally contentious national-security issue of his tenure, he failed to perform one of the most important parts of his job.

This combination of elfish charm and sub-par performance goes back a long way. Gates was tarnished by the Iran-Contra scandal of the mid-nineteen eighties, arguably the worst scandal since Watergate. At the time, he was deputy director of the C.I.A. under William Casey and admitted, in an earlier book, "From the Shadows," that, having been "dealt a lousy hand by the president and Congress, the Agency played it amazingly stupidly." That's putting it mildly. It was under Casey and Gates that the politicizing of intelligence that would prove so ruinous two decades later, in the Iraq War, began. The special prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, didn't prosecute Gates but, due to his deep involvement in the fiasco (including his faulty memory of when he learned of the arms-for-hostages deal), the Senate forced Gates to withdraw his nomination for C.I.A. director in 1987. "Did I do enough? Could I have done more?" he asks in "From the Shadows." He answers yes: "I gave myself a C-."

Such winning self-effacement has consistently helped endear Gates to Presidents; four years later, President George H. W. Bush, a good friend, renominated him. Gates got the big job at the C.I.A., but his judgment on the big issues didn't improve. He had received his Ph.D. for studying the Soviet Union, but he managed to miss the signs of its impending demise, calling Mikhail Gorbachev a "phony" and discounting his reforms as meaningless. Whether this was because Gates, a self-described hawk, was too dug into his Cold War views or because he listened too uncritically to misguided C.I.A. analysts -- or some combination -- remains unclear.

The third monumental foreign-policy issue of the last thirty years was the Iraq War. Gates was out of government, in 2003, when George W. Bush decided to go to war, but he acknowledges that he fully supported it. Biden supported the war, too, though at least Biden later admitted that he had been wrong. The conventional wisdom is that Gates, by now back in government, was right to support the 2006 surge in Iraq (and Biden wrong to oppose it), though many analysts now argue about whether it was really the increase in U.S. troops that brought down the level of violence.

President Obama made many of the right decisions -- moving more quickly than some commanders like to end the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy on gays in the military; trimming the defense budget; and raiding Osama bin Laden's compound -- over the objections of his Defense Secretary. On Afghanistan, Obama accepted large parts of Gates's compromise; a surge of thirty thousand troops split the difference between Biden's "counter-terrorism" plan (which featured drones strikes, special forces, and many fewer troops than the Pentagon wanted) and the "counter-insurgency" strategy, which called for forty thousand more troops and many years of nation building, and was favored by General Stanley McChrystal, most other top commanders, and Hillary Clinton. In "Duty," Gates explains at length how he served as broker amid an extremely complex set of policy choices. Right call? Maybe. But in a chapter entitled "A House Divided" he details bitter and personal divisions between the military and the White House over Afghanistan that can hardly be construed as success for a man who was in a position to prevent, or at least ease, them.

Before Obama made his decision about the surge, the Pentagon tried to box him in. McChrystal, the field commander, issued a report, which Gates reveals was leaked to Bob Woodward by McChrystal's staff, saying a ten-year counterinsurgency commitment, costing nearly one trillion dollars, was the only way to go. The general then turned insubordinate after a speech in London, telling the audience that he couldn't support the policy if the President decided in favor of a counter-terrorism plan to use drones and special forces instead of a large contingent of troops of the sort favored by Joe Biden. (McChrystal apologized for that comment and was fired the following year after he and his staff trashed Biden and others to Michael Hastings, a writer for Rolling Stone). The London comments came not long after General David Petraeus, then the head of all military operations in the region, told a conservative columnist that "it won't work if we don't" send a lot more forces. As if that weren't enough, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before Congress that many more troops were needed in Afghanistan.

Gates issued a public statement advising military commanders to give their advice to the President in private, not in public, but Obama was not mollified. The Commander-in-Chief was "livid," Gates writes. "Is it lack of respect for me?" Obama asked. Was it because he was young and hadn't served in the military? I learned, when I was researching my book, "The Promise: President Obama, Year One," that Obama dressed down the brass more sharply than any President had since Harry Truman fired General Douglas MacArthur. The President was so angry that when I interviewed him on-the-record later that fall and asked if he felt publicly "jammed" by the Pentagon before he made his Afghanistan decision, he replied, "I neither confirm nor deny that I've gotten jammed" -- an extraordinary comment for an American President to make about his own administration. Gates writes that he was "seething inside" when Obama and his chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, complained about the jamming. "I said that if there had been a strategy to do that, they [the brass] sure as hell wouldn't have been so obvious," Gates writes.

This is Gates propping up a straw man. Just because it wasn't a "Seven Days in May" scenario, with officers plotting a military coup, doesn't mean that the military wasn't trying to manipulate the President. They were upset that Obama didn't automatically accept their recommendations, as Bush had. "The Pentagon was used to getting what it wanted," Obama told me at the time. When it didn't, bad feelings arose. "A wall was going up between the military and the president," Gates writes.

In assessing his own mistakes in Afghanistan, Gates notes that his biggest was failing to ride herd over the Marines who, for inter-service turf reasons, initially deployed en masse to the Helmand Province, where many died, instead of to more populous regions, where their efforts would have been better aligned with the overall mission. Reports about Gates's book, though, have made it seem as if Obama's expression of ambivalence about his Afghanistan decision was somehow a strike against him. In truth, any thoughtful President should have reservations and second thoughts about many decisions, especially one at odds with his campaign promise to emphasize nation building at home.

Gates has some complimentary things to say about the President (especially regarding his analytical rigor and his treatment of veterans), but he admits that his anger sometimes clouded his judgment. When Obama, at Biden's suggestion, cast his decision on beginning a withdrawal from Afghanistan, in July of 2011, as a direct order (so that the military couldn't drag its feet), Gates felt insulted. He considered the order unnecessary, unprecedented, and a reflection of how much the White House misunderstood military culture. Only when it came time to write the book did he gain perspective. "My anger and frustration with the White House staff during the process led me to become more protective of the military and a stronger advocate for its position than I should have been," Gates writes. "All of us at the senior-most level did not serve the president well in this process. Our ‘team of rivals' let personal feelings and distrust cloud our perceptions and recommendations."

Gates reports no serious disagreements between the Pentagon and the White House on China, Russia, North Korea, the Middle East, terrorism, or Iran. We won't know for years if the lack of discord on those other national-security issues will improve the batting average of a Secretary of Defense who has set himself up nicely to be overrated by history. We do know that Gates's position on Afghanistan -- the one eventually adopted by the President -- ended up being, in his own words, "pretty close" to Joe Biden's.
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Monday, August 02, 2010

Is it "The Ghost of the Best and the Brightest"? Frank Rich ponders: "Why Has Obama Fallen Short?"

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Jonathan Alter's new book is described by Frank Rich as "a credible guide to what's gone right [with the Obama administration], but also to what's gone wrong and what, we must hope, can be fixed."

"Alter's chronicle confirms that the biggest flaw in Obama's leadership has to do with his own team, not his opponents, and it's a flaw that's been visible from the start. He is simply too infatuated with the virtues of the American meritocracy that helped facilitate his own rise. . . . [I]f Obama is not blinded by dollar signs, he suffers from a cultural class myopia. He's a patsy for 'glittering institutions that signified great achievement for a certain class of ambitious Americans.'"
-- Frank Rich, in his NYRB (Aug. 19) review of Jonathan
Alter's The Promise: President Obama, Year One

by Ken

I've written with depressing frequency about my inability to make sense of Barack Obama's campaign and presidency from the standpoint of what he himself believes, what he thinks he's doing, what his goals are. As his administration has come to seem more and more hopelessly misdirected, I've worried about this less, since it has come to seem to matter less -- whatever it is he thinks he's doing, we're stuck living with the results.

I'm not going to say that I've changed my mind about this, but Frank Rich has now provided me with the most reasonable account I've encountered of how the president views all of this. It comes in the form of a review of Newsweek and MSNBC correspondent Jonathan Alter's new book, The Promise: President Obama, Year One, on which it draws considerably.

Now it has been a running joke, and not an especially amusing one: all those media whores on the leftish slope of the Village brandishing their Obama-book contracts, with the ominous question hanging over them all of what they were willing to do, how they were willing to compromise themselves, in order to gain enough access to secure and deliver on those contracts.

It seems safe to venture that Rich is as aware as anyone of the credibility problem common to the Obama chroniclers. He applies his own sniff test to Alter's book.
There has been some sniping from the left and right that The Promise is hagiography, as Alter's sunny accounting of Obama's achievements might suggest. But that's not the case. One may quibble with some of Alter's emphases, but his well-reported, judicious book is as mindful of Obama's failings as his successes and seems to be carrying water for no one in the White House or outside it. It's a credible guide to what's gone right, but also to what's gone wrong and what, we must hope, can be fixed.

Alter's reporting feels trustworthy not just because it's nuanced and persuasively sourced but also because it spares us any of those tinny slam-bam-pow recreated "scenes" that have become a plague in books of this genre in the Bob Woodward era.

I'm going to assume that nobody reading DWT needs a refresher course on the claimed achievements of the Obama administration -- some of which are real, and some others at least partly so -- or the ways in which many of us who entertained at least some hopes have been disappointed. Rich's take on all of this is eminently worth reading, but doesn't seem to me to represent anything startlingly different from what we have generally known. So we're going to skip to the part where he tackles the question in the review's title: "Why Has He Fallen Short?"
Alter's chronicle confirms that the biggest flaw in Obama's leadership has to do with his own team, not his opponents, and it's a flaw that's been visible from the start. He is simply too infatuated with the virtues of the American meritocracy that helped facilitate his own rise. "Obama's faith lay in cream rising to the top," Alter writes. "Because he himself was a product of the great American postwar meritocracy, he could never fully escape seeing the world from the status ladder he had ascended." This led Obama to hire "broad-gauged, integrative thinkers who could both absorb huge loads of complex material and apply it practically and lucidly without resorting to off-putting jargon" -- and well, why not? Alter adds:
Almost all had advanced degrees from Ivy League schools, proof that they had aced standardized tests and knew the shortcuts to success exploited by American elites. A few were bombastic, but most had learned to cover their faith in their own powers of analysis with a thin veneer of humility; it made their arguments more effective. But their faith in the power of analysis remained unshaken.
This was a vast improvement over the ideologues and hacks favored by the Bush White House, but the potential for best-and-brightest arrogance was apparent as soon as Obama started assembling his team during the transition. The Promise leaves no doubt that his White House has not only fallen right into this trap but, for all its sophistication and smarts, was and apparently still is unaware that the trap exists. During the oil spill crisis, Obama and his surrogates kept reminding the public that the energy secretary, Steven Chu, was a Nobel laureate -- as if that credential were so impressive in itself that it could override any debate about the administration's performance in the gulf.

This misplaced faith in the best and the brightest has not coalesced around national security, as in the JFK-LBJ urtext, but around domestic policy -- especially in the economic team, whose high-handed machinations Alter chronicles in vivid detail. Contrary to some understandable suspicions on the left, Obama's faith in that team has nothing to do with any particular affection for captains of finance (his own campaign donors included), or their financial institutions, or wealth. "Over and over in his career, often to Michelle's chagrin, he had turned down chances to make more money," Alter writes. Obama is if anything annoyed by Wall Street's hypocrisy and tone-deaf behavior. "Let me get this straight," he said at one meeting about TARP and its discontents. "They're now saying that they deserve big bonuses because they're making money again. But they're making money because they've got government guarantees." Obama's angriest moment in his first year of office came when he heard that Lloyd Blankfein had claimed that Goldman was never in danger of collapse during the fall 2008 financial meltdown -- an assertion the President knew was flatly untrue.

But if Obama is not blinded by dollar signs, he suffers from a cultural class myopia. He's a patsy for "glittering institutions that signified great achievement for a certain class of ambitious Americans." In his books, he downplayed the more elite parts of his own resume -- the prep school Punahou in Hawaii, Columbia, and Harvard -- but he is nonetheless a true believer in "the idea that top-drawer professionals had gone through a fair sorting process" as he had. And so, Alter writes, he "surrounded himself with the best credentialed, most brilliant policy mandarins he could find, even if almost none of them knew anything about what it was like to work in small business, manufacturing, real estate, or other parts of the real economy." Not only did the director of the Office of Management and Budget, Peter Orszag, have the quintessential best-and-brightest resume (Princeton summa, Marshall Scholar, Ph.D. from the London School of Economics) but even the OMB spokesman, Ken Baer, had a Ph.D. from Oxford.

There is, of course, important disagreement about how much credit the Obama administration deserves for its achievements. Even taking the most charitable view, however --
it's hard not to wonder if much more would have been accomplished, both substantively and politically, had Obama's economic principals, Timothy Geithner and Lawrence Summers, been more open to ideas not of their own authorship and more capable of playing with others, including a public that still hardly knows either of them. Obama "apparently never considered appointing a banker or Fed governor from outside the East Coast who knew finance but was less connected to the policies that caused the crisis," Alter writes. The homogenous team he chose "all knew one another and all looked at the world through nearly identical eyes." Once in place in Washington, they would all underestimate the threat of rising unemployment, be blindsided by the populist anger rising outside the capital, and even fail to predict the no-brainer popularity of the "cash for clunkers" program. Their paramount group-think lapse -- their inability "to think more boldly about creating jobs fast" -- still haunts the administration. A White House job summit didn't materialize until December 2009, nearly a year too late.

The Promise depicts a carelessness and dysfunctionality in the economic team that at times matches that revealed by Rolling Stone in the military and civilian leadership of the team managing the Afghanistan war. Geithner's inexplicable serial income tax delinquencies, as elucidated by Alter, should have disqualified him for Treasury secretary just as Stanley McChrystal's role in the Pentagon's political coverup of Pat Tillman's friendly fire death should have barred him from the top military job in Afghanistan. Summers's Machiavellian efforts to minimize or outright exclude the input of ostensible administration economic players like Paul Volcker, Austan Goolsbee, and Christina Romer seem to have engaged his energies as much as the policy issues at hand.

In April 2009, at Obama's insistence, a group of economists that Summers had blocked from the Oval Office, including Volcker, Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and Alan Blinder, was invited to a White House dinner. That colloquy has been cited ever since by White House aides in response to complaints that the administration's economic circle is too insular. The dinner was a one-off, however, and the liberal economists' ideas about tougher financial reform and a more ambitious stimulus package have languished.

Obama may have entered the White House with the intention of assembling a Lincolnesque "team of rivals," but Summers subverted that notion by making himself chief packager and gatekeeper for any dissenting arguments about economic policy -- all, he claimed, to spare the President from meeting with "long-winded people." Lincoln's "team of rivals" reported directly to Lincoln, but, as one source told Alter, Summers so skewed the process in this White House that it was like "a team of rivals reporting to Edwin Stanton, Lincoln's prideful secretary of war." Even Warren Buffett, a supporter who had spoken to Obama weekly during the fall of 2008, "found himself mysteriously out of touch with the new president" once he took office.

Obama was now imprisoned within the cozy Summers-Geithner group "and it would be increasingly difficult for him to see beyond its borders." This "disconnection from the world," Alter concludes, was not due to ideology or the clout of special interests but was instead "the malign consequence of the American love of expertise, which, with the help of citadels of the meritocracy, had moved from a mere culture to something approaching a cult." For all Obama's skepticism of cant, he was "in thrall to the idea that with enough analysis, there was a ‘right answer' to everything. But a right answer for whom?"

Once he belatedly reached out to business leaders for other ideas, Obama began to overrule his own economists. Presumably he will continue to learn from his mistakes. The administration is still young, and so is the President. If he has any immutable ideological tenet, it's that he is "a big believer in persistence." He doesn't like to lose. Health care had not been an Obama priority in the campaign, but he embraced it during the transition. Though Joe Biden, Rahm Emanuel, and David Axelrod were all skeptical of pursuing it as a Year One goal, he wouldn't be deterred.

It frustrates me sometimes that people forget the vastness and deepness and impossibleness of the mess Obama inherited from the eight-year devastation of the Bush regime. Rich takes due note of this, but . . .
[I]t could be argued that the matrix of crises facing Obama would have outmatched any Bush successor, no matter how talented. (They certainly would have drowned John McCain, whose utter cluelessness about the economic crisis alarmed even his Republican allies in 2008.) But Obama knew what he was getting into when he ran for president, and the question that matters now is how he can do the job better.

The most challenging quandaries he has faced from the start, unemployment and Afghanistan, may be overcome only if he addresses his own internal obstacles. These include not just his misplaced faith in his own cultural cohort and his romantic illusions about bipartisan collaborations with a Mitch McConnell–John Boehner GOP that has no interest in governance. He might also reexamine his split-the-difference approach to decision-making. Compromise and pragmatism have their virtues, but they can also produce Rube Goldberg policies like an Afghanistan strategy that is at once intellectually clever and yet makes no discernible sense on the ground.

Which leads Rich to one final question: "Can Obama self-correct?"
He remains the same driven, smart, psychologically balanced leader we saw in the campaign, and to these familiar attributes, Alter adds another quality that is less frequently displayed in public -- an utter lack of sentimentality. He's "the most unsentimental man I've ever met," says one aide, summing up for many of his peers. That trait may be the most useful of all if Obama undertakes the ruthless course corrections that are essential to the realization of his promise.

PAUL KRUGMAN TAKES AN UNSETTLING
LOOK IN HIS CRYSTAL BALL


Just how big a course correction the administration needs to make is underscored in the column today of Rich's NYT colleague Paul Krugman, "Defining Prosperity Down," where he worries that workers are being permanently screwed in the U.S. economy based on "growing evidence that our governing elite just doesn't care — that a once-unthinkable level of economic distress is in the process of becoming the new normal."
In short, it's all good. And I predict — having seen this movie before, in Japan — that if and when prices start falling, when below-target inflation becomes deflation, some Fed officials will explain that that's O.K., too.

What lies down this path? Here's what I consider all too likely: Two years from now unemployment will still be extremely high, quite possibly higher than it is now. But instead of taking responsibility for fixing the situation, politicians and Fed officials alike will declare that high unemployment is structural, beyond their control. And as I said, over time these excuses may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the long-term unemployed lose their skills and their connections with the work force, and become unemployable.

I'd like to imagine that public outrage will prevent this outcome. But while Americans are indeed angry, their anger is unfocused. And so I worry that our governing elite, which just isn't all that into the unemployed, will allow the jobs slump to go on and on and on.
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Saturday, May 26, 2007

It was worth trying to shut down the war by congressional action, but it's time to recognize that it can't happen now and move on with Plan B

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"It's fine to urge opposition to the Iraq spending bill, but it's juvenile to toss around threats or make it seem as if voting wrong on this bill means you aren't sincerely against the war. In fact, what's going on inside the Democratic Party now is a family argument about tactics, not principle."
--Jonathan Alter of Newsweek, in a "web-exclusive commentary," "The Case for Gamesmanship"

I've been reading a lot of commentary, and have written some of it myself, denouncing Democrats who failed to oppose to the death the supplemental spending bills allowing Chimpy the Prez to continue his war in Iraq. I've also grown increasingly uncomfortable with the hysterical, absolutist, and all-knowing--even though it's not really all that smart--hectoring.

So when Howie mentioned Jonathan Alter's contrary argument, I went ahead and read it.

Alter makes clear that he has lots of disagreements with aspects of the Democratic congressional leadership's handling of the issue but insists that doesn't change "the elemental fact" "that Democrats may have won the midterms but they lack the votes to end the war in Iraq." They "didn't have anywhere near the votes to override [Bush's] veto [of their bill with a timetable for withdrawal]. Bush and his war might be terribly unpopular, but under our system, he's still holding the high cards."

So why not keep passing bills and letting Chimpy veto them ("the 'Chinese water torture' option backed by John Edwards, among others")? Two reasons, says Alter.

First, the country won't buy it. With a fanciful but persuasive "the kids are hungry" analogy, Alter points out that Republican strategists have been all primed to wage a Memorial Day jihad against Democrats who don't support the troops. "This is not a figment of some spineless Democrat's imagination but the reality of what he or she will face back in the district over Memorial Day."

However unpopular the war may be, anyone who thinks it's possible to survive the charge of not supporting our troops in the country at large is, I would say, completely out of contact with reality. That would be a bloodbath.

Second, Democrats don't even have the votes for the "Chinese water torture" strategy in the Senate--where, remember, they couldn't even pass their own bill without Republican votes.

I think it was worth trying to stop the war this way. It's not theoretically impossible to do so. But I think the people who are now screaming that this is the only acceptable approach have ever been honest, either with themselves or with their screamees, about just how hard this is to do. As we've discovered, real-world conditions simply don't exist at present for this solution.

What about the argument that Democrats have now made this their war?
Sen. Russ Feingold argues that by not voting to cut off funding, Democrats are becoming complicit, and taking co-ownership of the war. Feingold's far-sightedness on the war (he was much more prescient about its folly than I was) deserves great respect. But on this narrow political point, he is mistaken. Democrats who vote to cut off funding can be more easily blamed for the war's failures, especially in swing districts. That's why the leadership is letting members vote their consciences, rather than try to enforce a party line vote that would not prevail in the end, anyway.

So what do we do? What, then, is Alter arguing?
For Democrats, the world of Washington as it is requires a strategy of slowly ratcheting up pressure. They won an important tactical victory by forcing Bush to accept benchmarks for performance by the Iraqi government. Those benchmarks will prove useful when the Iraq war is revisited--first in July, when the big Defense Department funding bill comes up, and again in September, when Gen. David Petraeus reports on progress on meeting the benchmarks, or lack thereof, in Baghdad.

I encourage you not to settle for my mini-paraphrase. Here's the full Alter column:

Column/Between the Lines
Jonathan Alter  

 The Case for Gamesmanship

The Democrats' internecine squabbling over the war is a family argument about tactics, not a showdown over principle. The left should remember that.

Web-exclusive commentary
By Jonathan Alter
Newsweek
Updated: 4:16 p.m. ET May 24, 2007

May 24, 2007--It isn't easy to make the case for capitulation and gamesmanship when human lives are at stake, but I'm going to try. That's because many Americans--especially on the left--don't understand why Democrats in Congress had no choice but to proceed the way they have this week on the war in Iraq.

I undertake this unpleasant task as someone who has been arguing for a while that Democrats need to stiffen their spines. Last summer, for instance, after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and others then in the minority outlined their 2006 election agenda without focusing on Iraq, I wrote a tough column asserting that ending the war must be the primary issue for Democrats in the midterms.

But it's one thing to be tough; it's another altogether to criticize any member of the party who doesn't vote with MoveOn.org and others on the antiwar left as "Dick Cheney Democrats" cruising for a primary challenge, or at least a flaming from the liberal blogosphere. It's fine to urge opposition to the Iraq spending bill, but it's juvenile to toss around threats or make it seem as if voting wrong on this bill means you aren't sincerely against the war. In fact, what's going on inside the Democratic Party now is a family argument about tactics, not principle.

The first thing to understand is that Democrats may have won the midterms but they lack the votes to end the war in Iraq. Some liberals don't seem to get this elemental fact. A bill with a timetable for withdrawal was passed and sent to President Bush's desk. He vetoed it. Democrats didn't have anywhere near the votes to override the veto. Bush and his war might be terribly unpopular, but under our system, he's still holding the high cards.

So why not pass the bill again, have him veto it again, pass it again and have him veto it again--until the votes change? This is the "Chinese water torture" option backed by John Edwards, among others. It sounds gratifying, but there are two big problems with it.

The first is what might be called "the kids are hungry" dilemma. You're in a bad restaurant. Dad sends back the food. The waiter brings the same food back. Dad says it still stinks and sends it back again. He even vows not to pay for the meal. Trouble is, the kids are hungry and dad has promised repeatedly that he will "support the kids" by giving them whatever they need to stay well-nourished.

The whole "support the troops" meme has become a terrible problem for Democrats. Even though, as Glenn Greenwald has argued in Salon, cutting off funding doesn't mean soldiers will have their guns and bullets and armor taken away in the middle of a battle, Americans have been convinced that it does. They want to end the war and support the troops at the same time--i.e., send back the food and still eat.

This is not a figment of some spineless Democrat's imagination but the reality of what he or she will face back in the district over Memorial Day. Democrats who vote to cut funding not only risk getting thrown in the briar patch by Republican hit men in Washington; they also might not be able to satisfy their otherwise antiwar constituents at home.

The second problem is that even if Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid wanted to adopt the Chinese-water-torture approach, they don't have the votes for it in the Senate. Not gonna happen now. Pass-veto, pass-veto sounds good for Edwards on the stump but, sadly, bears no relation to reality on the ground in Washington. And the one thing we've learned from Bush's fiasco in Iraq is that we have to deal with the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.

For Democrats, the world of Washington as it is requires a strategy of slowly ratcheting up pressure. They won an important tactical victory by forcing Bush to accept benchmarks for performance by the Iraqi government. Those benchmarks will prove useful when the Iraq war is revisited--first in July, when the big Defense Department funding bill comes up, and again in September, when Gen. David Petraeus reports on progress on meeting the benchmarks, or lack thereof, in Baghdad.

I wish the Democrats had played tougher by including Rep. John Murtha's provision that any troops sent to Iraq would have to be better equipped. Bush privately promised to veto that, too, and they should have called his bluff. Vetoing a bill with no timelines, only a readiness requirement, might have been hard for the president, even if Murtha's amendment was, at bottom, a sly move to send fewer troops.

But the point is, reasonable people can disagree over tactics. Sen. Russ Feingold argues that by not voting to cut off funding, Democrats are becoming complicit, and taking co-ownership of the war. Feingold's far-sightedness on the war (he was much more prescient about its folly than I was) deserves great respect. But on this narrow political point, he is mistaken. Democrats who vote to cut off funding can be more easily blamed for the war's failures, especially in swing districts. That's why the leadership is letting members vote their consciences, rather than try to enforce a party line vote that would not prevail in the end, anyway. Pelosi's position is the right one--she's voting against the bill but not trying to make others do the same.

Would it be preferable if the Democrats hadn't prevented floor amendments, split the House bill in two and added domestic sweeteners? Sure, but this is politics, not the movies. It's the art of the possible. Elected representatives who recognize that reality deserve better than to be called "Dick Cheney Democrats."ve called his bluff. Vetoing a bill with no timelines, only a readiness requirement, might have been hard for the president, even if Murtha's amendment was, at bottom, a sly move to send fewer troops.

But the point is, reasonable people can disagree over tactics. Sen. Russ Feingold argues that by not voting to cut off funding, Democrats are becoming complicit, and taking co-ownership of the war. Feingold's far-sightedness on the war (he was much more prescient about its folly than I was) deserves great respect. But on this narrow political point, he is mistaken. Democrats who vote to cut off funding can be more easily blamed for the war's failures, especially in swing districts. That's why the leadership is letting members vote their consciences, rather than try to enforce a party line vote that would not prevail in the end, anyway. Pelosi's position is the right one--she's voting against the bill but not trying to make others do the same.

Would it be preferable if the Democrats hadn't prevented floor amendments, split the House bill in two and added domestic sweeteners? Sure, but this is politics, not the movies. It's the art of the possible. Elected representatives who recognize that reality deserve better than to be called "Dick Cheney Democrats."

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