Aid Strategy For Afghanistan Has Been As Unsatisfactory As Military Strategy

I rarely do a post about Cuba without consulting international troublespot writer Reese Erlich, whose book Dateline Havana is one of the best and most readable looks into U.S.-Cuba relations. Last June Reese was in Iran and gave DWT an inside look at the Iranian elections. His book, The Iran Agenda, is another must-read. So it didn't surprise me in the slightest when I got my first-ever e-mail from Kabul a few weeks ago... from Reese.

Yesterday he sent me my second. Many people eager to get U.S. troops out of Afghanistan are talking about sending more foreign aid. Having spent a good deal of time there in the late '60s-early '70s I didn't feel that was necessarily a good use for taxpayer dollars. And Reese confirmed my trepidation's by mentioning that "the same folks who brought us the $700 toilet seat are now in charge of US aid to Afghanistan. Some military and civilian contractors have now become adept at ripping off foreign aid money before it ever reaches the intended recipients." That's news that well-meaning progressives in Congress need to hear. And Reese's article in yesterday's San Francisco Chronicle, U.S. Aid Often Misses Targets In Afghanistan is something that needs to be distributed on Capitol Hill. It won't be.

As much as 80-90% of the aid money spent in Afghanistan goes everywhere except into the approved projects-- and even the approved projects wind up as useless junk doing nothing for U.S. policy goals and nothing for the long-suffering Afghan people. It started under the incompetent and venal Bush Regime... but apparently Hope and Change hasn't come to Afghanistan yet.

In 2003, the U.S. government believed local farmers could safely store and transport their crops and earn more money by exporting to neighboring countries. Building 145 market centers would also help swing Afghan public support behind the U.S. war effort, Bush administration officials argued at the time.

A Washington, D.C., company, Chemonics International, won the bid for the $145 million program-- known as Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program, or RAMP-- that ran from 2003 to 2006.

Chemonics then subcontracted the training and construction work to other Americans, who in turn subcontracted to numerous Afghan companies who did the work. At each level, the subcontractors deducted costs for salaries, office expenses and security, according to Afzal Rashid, a former senior adviser for the ministry of finance who now lives in Sacramento.

Only a small percentage of the original RAMP contract money actually reached farmers and other intended recipients, Rashid and other critics say. The exact percentage may never be known because neither Chemonics nor the U.S. government tracks such figures. Moreover, opponents note, many constructed market centers have deteriorated or are not being used for their original purpose.

In an exclusive interview with the Chronicle, Afghanistan's foreign minister, Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, sharply criticized how U.S. aid is spent in his country. He estimates that only "$10 or $20" of every $100 reaches its intended recipients.

The United States Agency for International Development, the agency responsible for most nonmilitary foreign aid, once employed tens of thousands of technical experts and contractors to staff aid programs around the globe. After the Vietnam War, however, the U.S. government deemed private enterprise more efficient at international assistance. Today, USAID has been reduced to being a contracting organization with just 2,200 employees, and only five engineers, according to recent news reports.

The inter-national aid agency Oxfam says USAID awards more than half of its Afghan aid to just five U.S. private con-tractors with close political ties in Washington: KBR, the Louis Berger Group, Bearing Point, DynCorp International and Chemonics International. USAID allows contractors to budget $500,000 annual salaries and benefits for high-ranking employees, and $200,000 for lower-ranking administrators, according to Rashid. All expatriate employees receive a bonus of up to 70 percent for hazard and hardship pay. The average Afghan civil servant, however, receives less than $1,000 a month.

Rashid and other critics say waste is built into the system. Expatriate employees bank most of their salary because companies pay for employee travel and living expenses.

"In a lot of cases the money goes from one bank account in the U.S. to another account in the U.S.," and never helps the economy of Afghanistan, said Rashid... Afghan officials and aid workers say smaller nongovernmental organizations that emphasize people-to-people aid have helped Afghan society and have kept overhead costs low. Former Finance Ministry adviser Rashid said Washington should rely more on such groups and Afghans themselves to administer future programs.

But Rashid concedes that direct funding of the Afghan government and contractors could also lead to increased corruption, a problem that has gained significant ground since the Taliban regime fell. But he says a multilayer system with improved oversight could diminish fraud.

Waste and corruption in Afghanistan are "tremendous problems," conceded Foreign Minister Spanta. But, he noted, since the United States delivers only 10 percent to 20 percent of its aid money to targeted Afghan recipients, "Afghanistan officials are not more wasteful or corrupt than that."

The U.S. has no business in Afghanistan and isn't capable of making a positive contribution there. There is only one solution: redeployment out... immediately. Earlier I mentioned Barbara Lee's bill, HR 3699, which would prohibit funding for escalation. It's a perfect first step. I also mentioned that we have a contest going on today for anyone who donates to No Means No.