EVER WONDER WHAT WENT ON IN HENRY KISSINGER'S MIND? (IT'S UGLY)

You may have read that war-criminal-on-the-loose, Henry Kissinger, told reporters this weekend that a military victory in Iraq is no longer possible. This probably came as much as a slap in the face to Bush as the slams he took in the last two days from old pals/rats deserting a sinking ship Matthew Dowd and Vic Gold. Why, you ask? Who cares what that discredited old publicity hound says? Bush-- at least according to a new book by historian Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power.

In recent years, President George W. Bush has consulted him for advice on the Iraq war, which Kissinger has supported. Since 2001, Kissinger has, according to Bob Woodward's State of Denial, met with the president every other month, and with Vice President Dick Cheney every month, and he has advised President Bush that "victory … is the only meaningful exit strategy" for Iraq.

Poor Bush! What a pathetic wretch.

But to be hung out to dry by Kissinger... he's not the only one. And others have fared far worse-- which is why he has to be very careful about which countries planes he's on land. He could easily win up in prison in quite a few of them. In any case, the excerpt from Dallek's book in the May issue of Vanity Fair (at the link above) is well worth reading. Here are a couple of excerpts from the excerpt:

Using language that has a painfully contemporary echo, Kissinger and Nixon very quickly came to private conclusions about Vietnam that they never revealed publicly and denied entertaining. "In Saigon the tendency is to fight the war to victory," Nixon told Kissinger, according to the transcript of a 1969 phone conversation. "But you and I know it won't happen—it is impossible." Even so, according to Haldeman's unpublished diaries, Nixon later urged that Democratic critics making this same point should be labeled "the party of surrender." When someone told Kissinger that Nixon could not be re-elected, because of Vietnam, he disputed it and added, according to a memo of a conversation, that "anytime we want to get out of Vietnam we can," and that "we will get out of Vietnam before the [1972] election." Nixon wanted to plan the removal of all U.S. troops by the end of 1971, but Kissinger cautioned that, if North Vietnam then de-stabilized Saigon during the following year, events could have an adverse effect on the president's campaign. According to Haldeman's diaries, Kissinger advocated a pullout in the fall of 1972, "so that if any bad results follow they will be too late to affect the election." He apparently had nothing to say about the American lives that would be lost by deliberately prolonging the war. Just before a peace treaty was signed, Kissinger in a phone conversation advised Nixon against stating that this was a "lasting peace or guaranteed peace because this thing is almost certain to blow up sooner or later."

See how much of this one can be related to anyone you happen to have been reading about in the last 6 years:

Kissinger's demands for influence and attention incensed Nixon, who occasionally talked about firing him. Watergate made this impossible. Nixon's need to use Kissinger and foreign policy to counter threats of impeachment made Kissinger an indispensable figure in a collapsing administration. The balance of power shifted massively and irrevocably.
Many facets of Kissinger's operating procedure were in full-blown display during the 1973 Yom Kippur War: the secrecy, the subterfuge, and the desire to gather power to himself. The crisis arose just as a convergence of domestic scandals rocked the White House. The president was losing his battle to keep the Watergate tapes under seal. The Saturday Night Massacre, when Nixon fired the Watergate special prosecutor and accepted the resignations of the attorney general and the deputy attorney general, was merely weeks away. And Vice President Spiro Agnew was on the verge of resigning, in the face of charges of extortion, bribery, and income-tax evasion. The president was deeply preoccupied, and at times incapacitated by self-pity or alcohol.
On the morning of October 6—Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar—Egypt attacked Israeli forces in the Sinai even as Syria struck the Israelis in the Golan Heights. A combination of complete surprise and effective preparation initially gave Egypt and Syria the advantage.
From the outset Kissinger, who was now secretary of state as well as national-security adviser, centered control of the crisis in his own hands. The Israelis had informed him of the attacks at six a.m. that Saturday, but three and a half hours would pass before he felt the need to consult Nixon, who had escaped Washington for his retreat in Key Biscayne, Florida. At 8:35 a.m., Kissinger called Haig, who was with the president, to report on developments. He said, according to a phone transcript, "I want you to know … that we are on top of it here." To ensure that the media not see Nixon as out of the loop, Kissinger urged Haig to say "that the President was kept informed from 6:00 a.m. on." When Kissinger finally called Nixon, at 9:25 a.m., the president left matters in Kissinger's hands. But he asked, according to a transcript, that Kissinger "indicate you talked to me."
At 10:35 a.m., Kissinger again called Haig. They discussed how to work with the Soviets to bring the fighting to a halt. When Haig reported that Nixon was considering returning to Washington, Kissinger discouraged it—part of a recurring pattern to keep Nixon out of the process. Over the next three days, Kissinger oversaw the diplomatic exchanges with the Israelis and Soviets about the war. Israeli prime minister Golda Meir's requests for military supplies, which were beginning to run low, came not to Nixon but to Kissinger. Although he consistently described himself as representing the president's wishes, Kissinger was seen by outsiders as the principal U.S. official through whom business should be conducted. On October 7, for example, a Brezhnev letter to Nixon was a response to "the messages you transmitted to us through Dr. Kissinger." On October 9, a telegram to King Hussein of Jordan urging continued non-involvement in the conflict came not from Nixon but from Kissinger.
Although Kissinger spoke to Nixon frequently during these four days, it was usually Kissinger who initiated the calls, kept track of the fighting, and parceled out information as he saw fit. On the night of October 7, according to a telephone transcript, Nixon asked Kissinger if there had been any message from Brezhnev. "Oh, yes, we heard from him," Kissinger replied, volunteering no more. Nixon had to press, asking lamely, "What did he say?"
At 7:55 on the night of October 11, Brent Scowcroft, Haig's replacement as Kissinger's deputy at the N.S.C., called Kissinger to report that the British prime minister, Edward Heath, wanted to speak to the president in the next 30 minutes. According to a telephone transcript, Kissinger replied, "Can we tell them no? When I talked to the President he was loaded." Scowcroft suggested that they describe Nixon as unavailable, but say that the prime minister could speak to Kissinger. "In fact, I would welcome it," Kissinger told Scowcroft.
What is striking is how matter-of-fact Kissinger and Scowcroft were about Nixon's condition, as if it had been nothing out of the ordinary—as if Nixon's drinking to excess was just part of the routine. They showed no concern at having to keep the prime minister of America's principal ally away from the president.

I don't know if the gangsters Bush has surrounded himself with as devious and treacherous as Kissinger-- although I would take a guess that they certainly are-- but this next bit makes you eager to see similar pieces come out about the current "meatball mind" in the not too distant future:

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were symbiotic rivals—men who shared many similarities, including cynicism and insecurity, and who desperately needed each other despite their often poisonous antagonism and mutual suspicion. Nixon distrusted Kissinger, doubting his professions of admiration. Kissinger's eagerness for the spotlight and his self-serving ambition put Nixon on edge. Nixon rightly believed that Kissinger saw himself as a superior intellect manipulating a malleable president. Nixon called him "my Jew boy" behind his back and occasionally to his face as a way to humiliate him and keep him in his place. Kissinger reciprocated, according to a raft of transcripts and other documents. He despised Nixon's top aides. "I have never met such a gang of self-seeking bastards in my life," Kissinger told the British ambassador in 1970, in a remark preserved in an ambassadorial memo in the National Archives in London. "I used to find the Kennedy group unattractively narcissistic, but they were idealists. These people are real heels." The president himself fared little better. Kissinger privately referred to Nixon as "that madman," "our drunken friend," and "the meatball mind."
By the spring of 1974, public attitudes toward Nixon and Kissinger were heading in opposite directions. The president's political survival seemed more uncertain with every passing day, while Kissinger's public standing reached new heights. Kissinger remained publicly supportive of Nixon, but in his own mind he viewed America's well-being as inextricably linked to his own.
After returning from the Middle East in June of 1974, Kissinger spoke by phone with Jacob Javits and told the New York senator, "You know, what really worries me, Jack, [is that,] with the President facing impeachment, what's been holding things together is my moral authority abroad and to some extent at home. If that's lost we may be really in trouble."