Monday, July 15, 2019

Midnight Meme Of The Day!

>


by Noah

The fact that President Obama orchestrated the disposal of Osama Bin Laden is just another Obama thing that Trump would love to undo. He'd consider Bin Laden a bestie for sure. Can't you just hear it? "Bin Laden writes me beautiful letters." "Getting along with terrorists is a good thing!" "He's got so many wives, so many, many wives. Some are very young, very young." "He's great at golf." "We fell in love." "He seems very interested in our financial community." "Beautiful letters. Tremendous letters." "He had me at 73 virgins."

Labels: ,

Saturday, July 21, 2018

Midnight Meme Of The Day!

>


by Noah

What would Traitor Don have to say to Osama bin Laden in some alternate timeline, in secret 'one on one only' meeting? Would it be "Just don't fly any planes into my Trump Towers" or would it be something else; something to do with Kushner properties in Manhattan or Ivanka's shoe factories in China? Would Traitor Don just be treasonous enough to cover up for bin Laden by saying he asked bin Laden if he was behind the 9/11 attacks and bin Laden said no, so he believed him? Who would Señor Trumpanzee believe and support; our intelligence people or bin Laden? Would he send our military personnel to Afghanistan in an act of retribution, or would a new bin Laden-financed Trump Tower-Kabul be going up as you read this?

Step back and imagine a world where Traitor Don had been our president at other times in our history instead of right now. Why not imagine Trump as president back in 2001? After all, he had first thought of running for president in 1998 or so. Or what if the Diaper Don had been our president in 1980? Would he have wanted Russia to "tear down that wall" or would he have taken a different stance? What if Comrade Trump had been president in place of Bush, of Reagan, of JFK, or FDR?

The real present time "President" Trump is a bad enough "president" and even worse humanoid so we don't really need to wonder what Trump would be like if he had been our president at other points in our nation's history but, hey, it pays to learn from history, even if it seems to come from some other weird dimension that's every bit as weird as our own. We know damn well how bad Trump would be in another historical timeline because we're living in this one. Trump as a "president" in another timeline would be (and I don't mean wouldn't) just as frightening as the "President" Trump in our own horrific reality where Trump has repeatedly praised and embraced Vladimir Putin; even covered up for him and equated the character of our intelligence people with the character of Putin himself.

So, with all of this in mind, I present to you the first two in a series of "Alt History Pres. Trumps Of The Past" memes, because the reality we live in is so bad that it's at least a little comforting to know that other Americans, somewhere, sometime, may have shared our misery even before we did. And, of course, even in such alternate universes, FOX "News" is known as The Treason Channel. They wouldn't have it any other way (and I don't mean would).





Labels: , , ,

Thursday, June 21, 2018

Notes on Seymour Hersh's book "Reporter"

>

An American soldier stoking a fire of burning houses during the My Lai massacre on March 16th, 1968 (Ronald S. Haeberle/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty)

by Gaius Publius

Seymour Hersh recently released a book on his life as a reporter, called appropriately, Reporter. It's gotten praise from many quarters, including from novelist and former intelligence officer John Le Carré: "This book is essential reading for every journalist and aspiring journalist the world over."

Journalist Matt Taibbi has apparently taken le Carré's words to heart, read it (no surprise) and written an interesting commentary on it for Rolling Stone. I'm drawing the observations below from Taibbi's observations.

On Intelligence Agencies "Going Rogue"

Taibbi recounts a story from Reporter about a time when Hersh, who makes his living discovering information that intelligence agencies don't want people to know, was handed a "treasure trove" of secret information the CIA did want him to know.

Taibbi writes:
Late in his new memoir, Reporter, muckraking legend Seymour Hersh recounts an episode from a story he wrote for the New Yorker in 1999, about the Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard.

Bill Clinton was believed to be preparing a pardon for Pollard. This infuriated the rank and file of the intelligence community, who now wanted the press to know just what Pollard had stolen and why letting him free would be, in their eyes, an outrage.

"Soon after I began asking questions," Hersh writes, "I was invited by a senior intelligence official to come have a chat at CIA headquarters. I had done interviews there before, but always at my insistence."

He went to the CIA meeting. There, officials dumped a treasure trove of intelligence on his desk and explained that this material – much of which had to do with how we collected information about the Soviets – had been sold by Pollard to Israel.

On its face, the story was sensational. But Hersh was uncomfortable. "I was very ambivalent about being in the unfamiliar position of carrying water for the American intelligence community," he wrote. "I, who had worked so hard in my career to learn the secrets, had been handed the secrets."
From this Taibbi takes this lesson: "This offhand line explains a lot about what has made Hersh completely embody what it means to be a reporter. The great test is being able to get information powerful people don't want you to have. A journalist who is handed something, even a very sensational something, should feel nervous, sick, ambivalent."

From the same story I take an additional lesson: The CIA, through an active, serving, "senior official," attempted to use an unauthorized intelligence leak of massive proportions to undermine and potentially sabotage the decision of an elected, sitting president, nominally the official's boss via the chain of command, all this in 1999, decades before Donald Trump.

Should Pollard have been pardoned by Clinton? Likely not. Pressure on Clinton from Israel and the Jewish-American community was intense, but he eventually decided against a pardon, and a look at the facts shows he made the right decision. Pollard had done quite a lot of damage, was unrepentant, and acted for gain as well as in the interests of Israel. So justice was done.

Yet the method attempted by the CIA to influence this decision included not just normal chain-of-command influence (going into the president's office and arguing the case), but backdoor leaks to the press (Hersh) calculated to make a pardon politically impossible. In other words, to box in a presidential decision, the agency decided to "go rogue" — use its access to classified intelligence material to force the president it serves to make a decision it preferred.

This is first cousin to blackmail by the keeper of the nation's secrets via a third party (Hersh), and it would actually have been blackmail had someone from the agency gone to Clinton ahead of time and told him of the plan. Which they may well have done.

Keep this intelligence community behavior in mind as you consider (a) how that community operates with respect to U.S. politics; and (b) how it may be helping to get rid of another elected, sitting president, one that few in the Beltway political establishment want to see continue in office.

To be clear: Should Trump be removed as president? I'm a strong yes on that, though you may disagree. How should he be removed? The answer to that sets precedent, doesn't it?

We've had presidents murdered out of office, most recently in 1963, in suspicious circumstances as a matter of fact. To my knowledge we haven't yet had one blackmailed out of office, though that clock has obviously not run out.

On CIA Assassination

Taibbi also brings up the history of political assassination carried out by the CIA: "Hersh was also among the first to describe a burgeoning American assassination program that to this day is poorly understood."
Within weeks of 9/11, for instance, Hersh quoted a "C.I.A. man" claiming the U.S. needed to "defy the American rule of law… We need to do this – knock them down one by one." He later reported on the existence of a "target list" and cited an order comparing the new tactics to El Salvadoran execution squads, reporting that much of this was going on without Congress being told.
That quote, about defying American rule of law, can be found in this New Yorker analysis of Hersh's writing about the executive assassination program in the post 9/11 years, "Close Read: What Did Seymour Hersh Say About Assassination?" published in 2009. It's quite revealing.

For even more about executive assassination, I strongly recommend reading this Hersh account of what really happened to Osama bin Laden — "The Killing of Osama bin Laden" — published in the London Review of Books.

A taste:
'They knew where the target was – third floor, second door on the right,' the retired official [one of Hersh's sources] said. Go straight there. Osama [by now an invalid] was cowering and retreated into the bedroom. Two shooters followed him and opened up. Very simple, very straightforward, very professional hit.' Some of the Seals were appalled later at the White House’s initial insistence that they had shot bin Laden in self-defence, the retired official said. 'Six of the Seals’ finest, most experienced NCOs, faced with an unarmed elderly civilian, had to kill him in self-defence?'
The whole thing, including Obama's shameful, self-serving sabotage of the agreed-upon plan, will fascinate you.

How to Be a Reporter

Taibbi ultimately reflects on the journalism business:
The job in many quarters has devolved into feeding captive audiences a steady stream of revelations framed to fit their preconceived ideas about the world, in order to keep them coming back. From Fox to MSNBC, the slant of programming has become more predictable, because audiences hate surprises and dislike being challenged. ...

Hersh's career is a tribute to the pursuit of the "unpredictable result." We used to value reporters who were willing to alienate editors and readers alike, if that's the way the truth cut. Now, as often as not, we just change the channel. This has been bad for both reporters and readers, who are losing the will to seek out and face the unpredictable truth.
I found myself speculating a little as I read those paragraphs. Matt Taibbi is already one of our most valuable journalists. Still, could this signal a change in his own career, or is this just an comment about someone else's career from his own desk at Rolling Stone? Taibbi's admiration is certainly obvious, as is his criticism of his peers.

Either way, Seymour Hersh has committed journalism of the most dangerous kind, putting him several steps ahead of what is now delivered to us as reporting. It would be nice to find a few more like him among the current crop.

GP
  

Labels: , , , , , , , ,

Friday, July 31, 2015

Gosh, if we'd only known about Mullah Omar, we could've at least sent a card or something

>


We could have had, like, a little memorial service? Or maybe sent a nice floral arrangement? (A local florist would have known what's in season over there.)

Milt Bearden, a former CIA operative in Pakistan and Afghanistan, said that “it is beyond puzzling” that Omar’s death could go unconfirmed for so long, especially given the intelligence and surveillance capabilities of the United States.

But “it’s another case of why intelligence collection in that part of the world is so difficult,” Bearden said. “The truth is layered, and there are multiple agendas, none of which we ever really understand.”
-- from "Taliban leader Omar's tale reflects clashing
agendas
," by the
Washington Post's Greg Miller

by Ken

It's a relief to find that a certified secret-intelligence pro is "beyond puzzled" by that two-year gap in getting out news of the death of Mullah Omar. At the same time, you wouldn't think that "alive" or "dead" would be a truth subject to such extensive layering.

Meanwhile, I'll bet there are Taliban fighers all over Greater Talibania frantically searching their memories now trying to figure out just how long ago it was they got that inspiring yet terrifying order: "Please to dispatch 20 infidels by sundown also clean out your cave it's disgusting. Kind regards Mullah O." Because as we know now, if the message came less than two years ago, it appears most unlikely that it was from the One-Eyed One after all, and it's now a much less interesting story to tell strangers passing through, not to mention the grandkids. ("You know, Mullah Omar and I were so close that . . . .")

After all, it was just a couple of weeks ago that there was buzz about the sudden appearance of a message from Mullah Omar. Daily Outlook Afghanistan reported "Mullah Omar's Dramatic Emergence; An Impetus to Talks."

Oops!

As breaking-newsbreaks go, it has to be that some luster is taken off the news of Mullah Omar's death by the fact that the event apparently happened two years ago. I wonder what would happen if I tried telling my landlord or mobile-phone service provider that that payment they're so hot to have is on its way when I what I really mean is "at some point in the next two years . . ."

It may also take some of the top off memorial services for Mullah O, the fact that the man hasn't been with us for, you know, two years now. You know that sparkling grape juice you were planning to serve? (It surely wouldn't do to celebrate the passing of a fundamentalist Muslim fighter with sparkling wine. I guess in view of the nature of this particular celebration, you'd want to open the bottles so the fizz goes flat.

One thing I don't think we have to worry about is the late Mullah O feeling slighted by the delay in recognition of his passing. I'm guessing he'd be pleased as punch to have put another one over on the Western infidels. At the same time, if he felt slighted in life by all the attention focused on that upstart interloper in his country Osama bin-Laden, he might smart at public disclosure that his whereabouts and elimination were subjects of vastly less interest to the Western infidel security apparatus -- that basically we infidels didn't give all that big a whoop whether Omar was alive or dead.

As to reasons why the news may be so late in coming, near the end of Greg Miller's Washington Post report we learn: "A former Pakistani official said parts of the government may have sought to keep Omar's death secret out of fear that Taliban factions would splinter without him and damage Islamabad’s ability to influence peace talks with Afghanistan."

The Western infidel security people certainly had inklings. Here's the start of Greg Miller's report:
In early 2011, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta confronted the president of Pakistan with a disturbing piece of intelligence. The spy agency had learned that ­Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader who had become one of the world’s most wanted fugitives after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, was being treated at a hospital in southern Pakistan.

The American spy chief even identified the facility — the Aga Khan University Hospital in Karachi — and said the CIA had “some raw intelligence on this” that would soon be shared with its Pakistani counterpart, according to diplomatic files that summarize the exchange.
U.S. intelligence officials now think that Omar probably died two years later, in 2013, and Afghan officials said this week that he succumbed while being treated for a serious illness in a Karachi hospital, just as those earlier intelligence reports had indicated.
Which suggests that if perhaps you were undergoing a medical procedure that you hoped might be kept under wraps -- a little cosmetic work, say -- that Karachi is a destination worth considering. As scary a place as we're often told it is, especially for Westerners, it does appear that the hospitals there know a thing or two about patient confidentiality.

But I digress.
The belated disclosure this week of Omar’s death has added to the legend of the ghostlike Taliban chief, a figure so elusive that it appears to have taken U.S. spy agencies two years to determine that one of their top targets after 9/11 was no longer alive.

But the emerging details of Omar’s death may also help explain the extent to which his ability to remain both influential and invisible was a reflection of the competing and often hidden agendas in the counterterrorism partnership between the United States and Pakistan.

Current and former U.S. ­officials said that despite intermittent intelligence on Omar’s whereabouts, there was never a concerted push to find him that remotely approached the scale of the manhunt for al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

At the same time, the one-eyed Taliban leader’s apparent ability to get medical treatment in the port city of Karachi has bolstered long-standing suspicions that Omar was being sheltered by Pakistan.
The Pakistanis, of course, don't want to hear this.
A Pakistani official described claims that Omar died in Pakistan or that the government was even aware of his presence in the country as “unfounded speculation.”

A Pakistani official described claims that Omar died in Pakistan or that the government was even aware of his presence in the country as “unfounded speculation.”
Then again, for any number of reasons, including all those drones we keep sending their way, Pakistani intelligence officials haven't been exactly Chatty Cathies with us in recent years. Robert Grenier, a former CIA station chief in Pakistan and former CIA counterterrorism chief tells Greg Miller of the relationship with Pakistan's much-feared intelligence directorate, the ISI:
Pretty quickly you could see a pattern. Where the ISI was very effective working with us in tracking down ­al-Qaeda, anytime we had a lead on a senior member of the Taliban, the Pakistanis weren’t successful in following up.
But then, Grenier also notes, "We were overwhelmingly focused on al-Qaeda." When U.S. forces stumbled across Taliban leaders, it seems to have been a surprise both to us and to the Pakistanis.

And Pakistani officials aren't necessarily all that high on the ISI's "need to know" list. A source described as "a former Pakistani official" -- the same former Pakistani official we heard earlier speculating that the Pakistani government may have deliberately tried to keep Mullah Omar's death secret for fear of post-Omar factionalizing of the Tabliban -- says "the ISI told Pakistani leaders in March this year 'that Mullah Omar is seriously ill and his condition is deteriorating.' "

It seems he could only have wished to be "seriously ill" and "deteriorating" this past March. So it goes.
#

Labels: , , , , ,

Tuesday, May 26, 2015

Osama's secret stashes

>



On May 20, 2015, the ODNI released a sizeable tranche of documents recovered during the raid on the compound used to hide Usama bin Ladin. The release, which followed a rigorous interagency review, aligns with the President’s call for increased transparency–consistent with national security prerogatives–and the 2014 Intelligence Authorization Act, which required the ODNI to conduct a review of the documents for release.

The release contains two sections. The first is a list of non-classified, English-language material found in and around the compound. The second is a selection of now-declassified documents.

The Intelligence Community will be reviewing hundreds more documents in the near future for possible declassification and release. An interagency taskforce under the auspices of the White House and with the agreement of the DNI is reviewing all documents which supported disseminated intelligence cables, as well as other relevant material found around the compound. All documents whose publication will not hurt ongoing operations against al-Qa‘ida or their affiliates will be released.

Now Declassified Material (103 items) [see list onsite]

Publicly Available U.S. Government Documents (75 items) [see list onsite]

English Language Books (39 items) [see list onsite]

[plus Material Published by Violent Extremists and Terror Groups (35 items), Materials Regarding France (19 items), Media Articles  (33 items), Other Religious Documents (11 items), Think Tank and Other Studies (40 items), Software and Technical Manuals (30 items), Other Miscellaneous Documents, and Documents Probably Used by Other Compound Residents (10 items)]
-- from the website of the ODNI
by Ken

As you've undboutedly heard, a veil has begun to be lifted over the stuff Osama bin Laden left behind in his final hideaway in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Suddenly we're privy to a cache of e-mails sent and received and a stash of 39 English-language books he kept.

Who knew we could go to the Web page of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for dish? I actually find this more interesting than the revelations so far revealed regarding the late Osama bin Laden, revelations that included both assorted documents and the titles of 39 English-language books that formed an odd little library of sorts linked to Osama in the Abbottabad compound to which he was traced and in which he was killed by Navy SEALs.

Note for the record that the ODNI Web page specifies:
This list contains U.S. person information that is being released in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2014 Intelligence Authorization Act (section 309) requirement that the Director of National Intelligence conduct a declassification review of certain items collected during the mission that killed Usama bin Ladin on May 1, 2011, and make publicly available any information declassified as a result of such review.

All publications are unclassified and available commercially or in the public domain.

The U.S. Intelligence Community does not endorse any of the publications on this list.
By now everyone, his brother, and his butcher has had a shot at analyzing Osama's English-language bookshelf for what the titles reveal about, well, goodness-only-knows-what. You can google a dozen or two of those. My favorite theory, though, is provided by Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, in a washingtonpost.com "PostEverything" post, who had a shock of recognition looking at the mini-library and from personal experience recognized "Osama bin Laden, perpetual impoverished grad student."

While acknowledging that "if there is a common theme to his English-language library, it’s great power war and imperial decline" ("that fits both his conspiracy books and his more conventional selections"), he's struck by the "scattershot nature" of the selections.
There were other quality books on empire that bin Laden should have had in his possession given that he was so invested in this topic. Why this odd mix?
And that's when the light bulb lit.
[A]s I perused this mish-mash of conspiracy tomes, quasi-conspiracy tomes, radical texts, mainstream bestsellers, and the occasional hidden gem, it struck me as an off-kilter, but very familiar mix.

And that’s when it hit me: this is the precise collection of books you would find if you went to a used bookstore and bought out the entire international relations section.

Any former graduate student who trolled used bookstores in search of bargains while living off of a modest stipend in the days before Amazon.com knows what I’m talking about. The search for book bargains never ends for impoverished grad students.
And for Professor Drezner, the pieces all fit together: Osama's known "deep frustration with the isolation at his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan" and al-Qaeda's reputation as "a remarkably stingy operation in terms of its expenses and reimbursement procedures."
And he imagines a scene inside the Abbottabad compound beetween Osama and courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti:
BIN LADEN: I’m bored. There’s nothing to do here.
AL KUWAITI: So go read a magazine.
BIN LADEN: I’ve read every magazine three times now. Even the porn ones are getting old.
AL KUWAITI: Fine, I’ll go get you some new stuff.
BIN LADEN: No, I need books to study the enemy. Go and fetch me some books on the fading American Empire.
AL KUWAITI: Fine.
BIN LADEN: But don’t spend too much, OK?
AL KUWAITI:  Fine.
BIN LADEN:  Seriously, nothing from Barnes and Noble. Go to an independent bookstore. Wait, better yet, a used one!
AL KUWAITI: Fine.
BIN LADEN: And make sure you get a receipt.
AL KUWAITI: Fine!!!!
Actually, I'm so tickled by the professor's nifty theory that I've devoted much more space than I intended to what has been revealed by the DNI. Because I'm more interested in what hasn't been revealed.


THE BIG GUY'S PORN STASH

This is the most obvious omission. It's conceded that the Big Guy had a porn stash. For some reason, though, the ODNI watchdogs have declined to release any more information about it. Not only is this disappointing for both bin Laden and smut enthusiasts, it misses a prime opportunity to build traffic on the ODNI website. They'll miss all those extra clicks they could have had when they start accepting advertising.

Here's how the Daily Mail reported the smut story:
U.S. officials refuse to release details on the 'extensive' porn collection found in Osama bin Laden's Pakistani bolt-hole, because of the 'nature' of the smut. . . .

While it was widely reported that Navy SEALs recovered a large digital collection of sex videos from the compound when they staged a secret mission to kill bin Laden in 2011, the U.S. government says it is not going to describe or release details on any of the pornographic materials.

'We have no plans to release that at this point in time,' Brian Hale, a spokesman for the DNI, told The Telegraph, 'Due to the nature of the content the decision was made not to release it.'

Officials also refused to describe what kind of porn was kept in the bin Laden household.

Just two weeks after bin Laden was shot dead inside his Abbottabad compound, Reuters reported that pornography was recovered from the property. At the time, the collection was described as 'fairly extensive,' containing many modern videos.

It's estimated that bin Laden lived in the house with about 22 others, so it's unknown whether bin Laden actually watched any of the tapes.

However, the detail painted the al Qaeda leader as a hypocrite, since watching porn clashed with his fundamentalist image. 

AND THE OTHER, REALLY SECRET LIBRARY

My sources, who are unimpeachable and pinky-swear that they didn't just make this up, insist that there was another, even more secret English-language library, which for some reason remains classified. What distinguishes this group, apparently, is that all of these books are inscribe -- though apparently all in variations of the same hand, described as "like a third-grader's, or someone who's not writing in his native script."

For example, the first title on the list, Stephen Raichlen's Barbecue! Bible, is said to be inscribed: "Nobody can dry-rub and slow-roast a slab of mean like the O-man. XOXO, Steve." And The Fountainhead is inscribed: "This is one hot broad, Osama, baby. I'll never forget our long sessions together. Your workout body, U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan." And the Martha Stewart volume is inscribed: "In remembrance of our times together in the chicken coop. Yours ever, Martha."

The Barbecue! Bible (Stephen Raichlen)
The Bridges of Madison County (Robert James Waller)
Winston Churchill: The Wit and Wisdom of
Fifty Shades of Grey (E. L. James)
The Fountainhead (Ayn Rand)
The Gilmore Girls Companion (A. S. Berman)
The Godfather (Mario Puzo)
Going Rogue: An American Life (Sarah Palin)
The Little House Collection Box Set (Laura Ingalls Wilder)
Male Grooming: Fabulous Tips on Looking Great (Ed West)
Leonard Maltin's Movie and Video Guide 1996
The Man Who Owns the News: Inside the Secret World of Rupert Murdoch (Michael Wolff)
Men Are Stupid . . . And They Like Big Boobs: A Woman's Guide to Beauty Through Plastic Surgery (Joan Rivers with Valerie Frankel)
The Metrosexual Man: A Head to Toe Guid to Male Grooming and Manscaping (Gabriel Villa)
The Mill on the Floss (George Eliot)
Rachael Ray's Look + Cook
Remembrance of Things Past (Marcel Proust)
Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer Coloring Book
Seinfeld Ultimate Episode Guide (Dennis Bjorklund)
Martha Stewart Entertaining
Take My Wife, Please! Henny Youngman's Giant Book of Jokes
Titanic and the Making of James Cameron (Paula Parisi)
The Valley of the Dolls (Jacqueline Susann)
The War for Late Night: When Leno Went Early and Television Went Crazy (Bill Carter)
You Might Be a Redneck If (Jeff Foxworthy)
You: Staying Young: The Owner's Manual for Extending Your Warranty (Michael Roizen and Dr. Oz)
#

Labels:

Monday, March 30, 2015

What ISIS Really Wants​

>


ISIS flag (source and analysis)

by Gaius Publius

I found the following piece, by Graeme Wood writing at The Atlantic, a compelling and riveting read. First, it attempts to answer the question: What is ISIS, really? Second, it sounds an alarm — that misunderstanding ISIS has accounted for, and will account for, major American policy and strategic mistakes. As you'll read below, the author says (my emphasis):
“We have not defeated the [ISIS] idea,” [the U.S. Special Operations commander in the Middle East] said. “We do not even understand the idea.” In the past year, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors.
Bottom line: ISIS is a religious group, very unlike al-Qaeda, and very much interested in conquered territory. Also, very seventh-century. Below is the piece's introduction. Do click through for the rest. Even if you don't end up agreeing with all the points made, the article is meticulously researched and you'll learn much, including how to watch this Middle East news as it unfolds. Graeme Wood did extensive in-region interviews for this article.

Four points to note before I present the piece itself:
  • For ISIS adherents, all Shiites and all Muslim heads of state are "apostates" to Islam, not just "sinners," and thus must be marked for death. He who refuses to kill them is himself a "sinner."
  • Executions for apostasy happen "more or less continually, and mass executions every few weeks" in ISIS-held territory.
  • ISIS adherents, like many Christian fundamentalists, are trying to bring about the Apocalypse.
  • The way ISIS's interpretation of Sharia constrains and controls its war planning is not well understood in the West, but it offers crucial advantages to those who do understand it.
As the piece says, in a part not quoted below, "Following takfiri doctrine [which deals with proper treatment of apostates], the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people." Now the article:
What ISIS Really Wants

The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it. 

What is the Islamic State?

Where did it come from, and what are its intentions? The simplicity of these questions can be deceiving, and few Western leaders seem to know the answers. In December, The New York Times published confidential comments by Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal. “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even understand the idea.” In the past year, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors.

The group seized Mosul, Iraq, last June, and already rules an area larger than the United Kingdom. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been its leader since May 2010, but until last summer, his most recent known appearance on film was a grainy mug shot from a stay in U.S. captivity at Camp Bucca during the occupation of Iraq. Then, on July 5 of last year, he stepped into the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, to deliver a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations—upgrading his resolution from grainy to high-definition, and his position from hunted guerrilla to commander of all Muslims. The inflow of jihadists that followed, from around the world, was unprecedented in its pace and volume, and is continuing.

Our ignorance of the Islamic State is in some ways understandable: It is a hermit kingdom; few have gone there and returned. Baghdadi has spoken on camera only once. But his address, and the Islamic State’s countless other propaganda videos and encyclicals, are online, and the caliphate’s supporters have toiled mightily to make their project knowable. We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.

The Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy, and can help the West know its enemy and predict its behavior. Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than like the realization of a dystopian alternate reality in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.

We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways. First, we tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al‑Qaeda to an organization that has decisively eclipsed it. The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to Osama bin Laden as “Sheikh Osama,” a title of honor. But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership.

Bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not expect to see in his lifetime. His organization was flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells. The Islamic State, by contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it. (Its bureaucracy is divided into civil and military arms, and its territory into provinces.)

We are misled in a second way, by a well-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State’s medieval religious nature. Peter Bergen, who produced the first interview with bin Laden in 1997, titled his first book Holy War, Inc. in part to acknowledge bin Laden as a creature of the modern secular world. Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently. On Mohamed Atta’s last full day of life, he shopped at Walmart and ate dinner at Pizza Hut.

There is a temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse.

The most-articulate spokesmen for that position are the Islamic State’s officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively to “moderns.” In conversation, they insist that they will not—cannot—waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often speak in codes and allusions that sound odd or old-fashioned to non-Muslims, but refer to specific traditions and texts of early Islam.

To take one example: In September, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the Islamic State’s chief spokesman, called on Muslims in Western countries such as France and Canada to find an infidel and “smash his head with a rock,” poison him, run him over with a car, or “destroy his crops.” To Western ears, the biblical-sounding punishments—the stoning and crop destruction—juxtaposed strangely with his more modern-sounding call to vehicular homicide. (As if to show that he could terrorize by imagery alone, Adnani also referred to Secretary of State John Kerry as an “uncircumcised geezer.”)

But Adnani was not merely talking trash. His speech was laced with theological and legal discussion, and his exhortation to attack crops directly echoed orders from Muhammad to leave well water and crops alone—unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position, in which case Muslims in the lands of kuffar, or infidels, should be unmerciful, and poison away.

The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.

Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology,” which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. We’ll need to get acquainted with the Islamic State’s intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead help it self-immolate in its own excessive zeal.
There follow a number of sections discussing the nature of the religious devotion of the ISIS fighters, their belief in the imminent Apocalypse, and how adherence to strict seventh-century Islam constrains the way ISIS can conduct its war.

About ISIS as a religious movement, the author quotes Princeton scholar Bernard Haykel and notes:
All Muslims acknowledge that Muhammad’s earliest conquests were not tidy affairs, and that the laws of war passed down in the Koran and in the narrations of the Prophet’s rule were calibrated to fit a turbulent and violent time. In Haykel’s estimation, the fighters of the Islamic State are authentic throwbacks to early Islam and are faithfully reproducing its norms of war.
There's a lot of "blood and guts" in many early versions of modern religions, including the Christian and the Hebrew Bibles. It needs to be said that ISIS fighters are taking that aspect of their religion literally, in the sense that they're following the whole of the early how-we-fight-pagans prescriptions. It also needs to be said that almost all of the world's Muslims don't take that aspect of their religions literally:
Leaders of the Islamic State have taken emulation of Muhammad as strict duty, and have revived traditions that have been dormant for hundreds of years. “What’s striking about them is not just the literalism, but also the seriousness with which they read these texts,” Haykel said. “There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness that Muslims don’t normally have.”
This includes adherence to slavery, a worldwide custom in the ancient and early medieval world:
“We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women,” Adnani, the [ISIS] spokesman, promised in one of his periodic valentines to the West. “If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market.”
He means that literally, and U.S. policy-makers should understand that he does. In the section called "The Fight," the writer says:
The ideological purity of the Islamic State has one compensating virtue: it allows us to predict some of the group’s actions. Osama bin Laden was seldom predictable. He ended his first television interview cryptically. CNN’s Peter Arnett asked him, “What are your future plans?” Bin Laden replied, “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing.” By contrast, the Islamic State boasts openly about its plans—not all of them, but enough so that by listening carefully, we can deduce how it intends to govern and expand. ...
And:
It’s hard to overstate how hamstrung the Islamic State [and its ability to wage war] will be by its radicalism.
I'll let you read why. The section on Apocalypse makes fascinating reading as well. If you're inclined to expand your understanding of this group, I urge you to take a long look at this fascinating article.

GP

Labels: , , , , , ,

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

How Many More Billions In Taxpayer Dollars Will The Military Industrial Complex Waste On Pakistan's Corrupt Oligarchy?

>




Unless you read your NY Times in Pakistan, where the story was disappeared, you probably read about how the Pakistanis knew exactly where Osama bin-Laden was while they took billions of dollars in American aid and pretended to be looking for him. This wasn't really a secret, just another manifestation of the expensive dysfunction that the U.S. spy agencies have always been. Right from the beginning. Failure, failure, failure-- and billions and billions and unknowable billions of dollars wasted. The spy agencies aren't worth shit-- except for unconstitutional spying on American citizens.

Carlotta Gall, a Times correspondent who spent 12 years in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attack, excerpted parts of her upcoming book, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 for her Times Magazine piece on March 19, "What Pakistan Knew About Bin Laden." She knew all along-- as anyone remotely aware of history knew-- that the authors of Afghanistan's misery were located in Afghanistan, very much under the control of Pakistan's notorious local version of the CIA, the ISI, and the extremist "religious" schools or madrassas. Furthermore, bolstering all the circumstantial evidence, a former ISI chief and retired general, Ziauddin Butt, told her that he thought Musharraf had arranged to hide Bin Laden in Abbottabad.
“The madrasas are a cover, a camouflage,” a Pashtun legislator from the area told me. Behind the curtain, hidden in the shadows, lurked the ISI.

The Pakistani government, under President Pervez Musharraf and his intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, was maintaining and protecting the Taliban, both to control the many groups of militants now lodged in the country and to use them as a proxy force to gain leverage over and eventually dominate Afghanistan. The dynamic has played out in ways that can be hard to grasp from the outside, but the strategy that has evolved in Pakistan has been to make a show of cooperation with the American fight against terrorism while covertly abetting and even coordinating Taliban, Kashmiri and foreign Qaeda-linked militants. The linchpin in this two-pronged and at times apparently oppositional strategy is the ISI. It’s through that agency that Pakistan’s true relationship to militant extremism can be discerned-- a fact that the United States was slow to appreciate, and later refused to face directly, for fear of setting off a greater confrontation with a powerful Muslim nation.

…The story they didn’t want out in the open was the government’s covert support for the militant groups that were propagating terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond… After years of nurturing jihadists to fight its proxy wars, Pakistan was now experiencing the repercussions. “We could not control them,” a former senior intelligence official told a colleague and me six months after the Red Mosque siege.

…Yet even as the militants were turning against their masters, Pakistan’s generals still sought to use them for their own purpose, most notoriously targeting Pakistan’s first female prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, who was preparing to fly home from nearly a decade in exile in the fall of 2007. Bhutto had forged a deal with Musharraf that would allow him to resign as army chief but run for another term as president, while clearing the way for her to serve as prime minister. Elections were scheduled for early 2008.

Bhutto had spoken out more than any other Pakistani politician about the dangers of militant extremism. She blamed foreign militants for annexing part of Pakistan’s territory and called for military operations into Waziristan. She declared suicide bombing un-Islamic and seemed to be challenging those who might target her. “I do not believe that any true Muslim will make an attack on me because Islam forbids attacks on women, and Muslims know that if they attack a woman, they will burn in hell,” she said on the eve of her return.

She also promised greater cooperation with Afghanistan and the United States in combating terrorism and even suggested in an interview that she would give Western officials access to the man behind Pakistan’s program of nuclear proliferation, A. Q. Khan.

President Karzai of Afghanistan warned Bhutto that his intelligence service had learned of threats against her life. Informers had told the Afghans of a meeting of army commanders-- Musharraf and his 10 most-powerful generals-- in which they discussed a militant plot to have Bhutto killed.

On Oct. 18, 2007, Bhutto flew into Karachi. I was one of a crowd of journalists traveling with her. She wore religious amulets and offered prayers as she stepped onto Pakistani soil. Hours later, as she rode in an open-top bus through streets of chanting supporters, two huge bombs exploded, tearing police vans, bodyguards and party followers into shreds. Bhutto survived the blast, but some 150 people died, and 400 were injured.

Bhutto claimed that Musharraf had threatened her directly, and Karzai again urged her to take more precautions, asking his intelligence service to arrange an armored vehicle for her equipped with jammers to block the signals of cellphones, which are often used to detonate bombs. In the meantime, Bhutto pressed on with her campaign, insisting on greeting crowds of supporters from the open top of her vehicle.

In late December, a group of militants, including two teenage boys trained and primed to commit suicide bombings, arrived at the Haqqania madrasa in the northwestern town of Akora Khattak. The madrasa is a notorious establishment, housing 3,000 students in large, whitewashed residence blocks. Ninety-five percent of the Taliban fighting in Afghanistan have passed through its classrooms, a spokesman for the madrasa proudly told me. Its most famous graduate is Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran Afghan mujahedeen commander whose network has become the main instrument for ISI-directed attacks in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan.

The two young visitors who stopped for a night at the madrasa were escorted the next day to Rawalpindi, where Bhutto would be speaking at a rally on Dec. 27. As her motorcade left the rally, it slowed so she could greet supporters in the street. One of the two teenagers fired a pistol at her and then detonated his vest of explosives. Bhutto was standing in the roof opening of an armored S.U.V. She ducked into the vehicle at the sound of the gunfire, but the explosion threw the S.U.V. forward, slamming the edge of the roof hatch into the back of her head with lethal force. Bhutto slumped down into the vehicle, mortally wounded, and fell into the lap of her confidante and constant chaperone, Naheed Khan.

As Bhutto had long warned, a conglomeration of opponents wanted her dead and were all linked in some way. They were the same forces behind the insurgency in Afghanistan: Taliban and Pakistani militant groups and Al Qaeda, as well as the Pakistani military establishment, which included the top generals, Musharraf and Kayani. A United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of Bhutto’s death found that each group had a motive and merited investigation.

Pakistani prosecutors later indicted Musharraf on charges of being part of a wider conspiracy to remove Bhutto from the political scene. There was “overwhelming circumstantial evidence” that he did not provide her with adequate security because he wanted to ensure her death in an inevitable assassination attempt, the chief state prosecutor in her murder trial, Chaudhry Zulfiqar Ali, told me. (Musharraf denied the accusations.) A hard-working, hard-charging man, Ali succeeded in having Musharraf arrested and was pushing to speed up the trial when he was shot to death on his way to work in May 2013.

Ali had no doubts that the mastermind of the plot to kill Bhutto was Al Qaeda. “It was because she was pro-American, because she was a strong leader and a nationalist,” he told me. A Pakistani security official who interviewed some of the suspects in the Bhutto case and other militants detained in Pakistan’s prisons came to the same conclusion. The decision to assassinate Bhutto was made at a meeting of the top council of Al Qaeda, the official said.

It took more than three years before the depth of Pakistan’s relationship with Al Qaeda was thrust into the open and the world learned where Bin Laden had been hiding, just a few hundred yards from Pakistan’s top military academy. In May 2011, I drove with a Pakistani colleague down a road in Abbottabad until we were stopped by the Pakistani military. We left our car and walked down a side street, past several walled houses and then along a dirt path until there it was: Osama bin Laden’s house, a three-story concrete building, mostly concealed behind concrete walls as high as 18 feet, topped with rusting strands of barbed wire. This was where Bin Laden hid for nearly six years, and where, 30 hours earlier, Navy SEAL commandos shot him dead in a top-floor bedroom.

…Soon after the Navy SEAL raid on Bin Laden’s house, a Pakistani official told me that the United States had direct evidence that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, knew of Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. The information came from a senior United States official, and I guessed that the Americans had intercepted a phone call of Pasha’s or one about him in the days after the raid. “He knew of Osama’s whereabouts, yes,” the Pakistani official told me. The official was surprised to learn this and said the Americans were even more so. Pasha had been an energetic opponent of the Taliban and an open and cooperative counterpart for the Americans at the ISI. “Pasha was always their blue-eyed boy,” the official said. But in the weeks and months after the raid, Pasha and the ISI press office strenuously denied that they had any knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad.

Colleagues at The Times began questioning officials in Washington about which high-ranking officials in Pakistan might also have been aware of Bin Laden’s whereabouts, but everyone suddenly clammed up. It was as if a decision had been made to contain the damage to the relationship between the two governments. “There’s no smoking gun,” officials in the Obama administration began to say.

…America’s failure to fully understand and actively confront Pakistan on its support and export of terrorism is one of the primary reasons President Karzai has become so disillusioned with the United States. As American and NATO troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of this year, the Pakistani military and its Taliban proxy forces lie in wait, as much a threat as any that existed in 2001… Pakistani security officials, political analysts, journalists and legislators warned of the same thing. The Pakistani military was still set on dominating Afghanistan and was still determined to use the Taliban to exert influence now that the United States was pulling out.

Labels: , , , , , ,

Thursday, August 29, 2013

Welcome to IntelligenceWorld, where secrecy and budgets are sky-high, and intelligence, not so much

>


By the unanimous vote of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Martin Luther King Jr. -- in the wake of the 1963 March on Washington and the "I have a dream" speech -- was named "the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of Communism, the Negro and national security."

by Ken

I can't help thinking that the three stories below are related, that in fact while they involve three totally separate government entities -- the FBI with its "dangerous Negro of the future" Martin Luther King Jr., the NYPD with its "terrorist" mosques, and the constellation of federal tentacles that gather "intelligence" for the War on Terror -- they're essentially parts of the same story.

In the third story, note that the Washington Post reporters are at pains to make clear that the documents from which their report derives, which come to us via leaker Edward Snowden, were handled with great discretion.
The Washington Post is withholding some information after consultation with U.S. officials who expressed concerns about the risk to intelligence sources and methods. Sensitive details are so pervasive in the documents that The Post is publishing only summary tables and charts online.
Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that we have this information only because of Edward Snowden. Our government doesn't believe we should know anything about how the $52.6B a year budgeted for national security is spent, or what we're getting for it. Any more than J. Edgar Hoover thought we should know about his personal war on Martin Luther King Jr., or the NYPD thinks we should know it secretly spies on whole mosques even in the absence of any indication of criminal activity.

Is it any wonder that our "intelligence" community and its enablers go ballistic about the activities of someone like Edward Snowden? They have the temerity to aid and abet the secret-holders' apparent real No. 1 enemy: us.


[I] MLK: AMERICA'S "MOST DANGEROUS NEGRO OF THE FUTURE"
FBI called MLK 'most dangerous Negro' in the U.S. after 'I Have a Dream' speech

By David Ferguson
Thursday, August 29, 2013 7:51 EDT

Wednesday night on "The Rachel Maddow Show," host Rachel Maddow discussed the fact that not everyone in the U.S. government was happy about the March on Washington in 1963. The Federal Bureau of Investigation -- under the leadership of ultra-conservative cross-dresser and closeted gay man J. Edgar Hoover -- considered the civil rights marchers to be instruments of the global communist threat within U.S. borders.

The FBI kept extensive records on Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in particular, recording his phone conversations and keeping agents on a constant surveillance beat. In the days after his historic "I Have a Dream" speech, Hoover circulated an FBI memo that said, "In light of King's powerful, demagogic speech yesterday, we must mark him now, if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of Communism, the Negro and national security."

Hoover sent that memo around Washington, the the White House and the Pentagon. By October of 1963, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy authorized unlimited wiretapping and bugging of the civil rights leader.

"Eight wire taps, 16 bugs," Maddow said, "his phones, his hotel rooms, his bedrooms. And they used the sound that they collected, the used the information they collected in those wiretaps to try to destroy Dr. King, both professionally and personally."

"When he was awarded the Nobel Peach Prize," she continued, "J. Edgar Hoover personally convened a press conference in his office in which he personally called Martin Luther King a 'notorious liar.'"

FBI intelligence chief Bill Sullivan reportedly assembled a compilation of recorded sounds of King having sex with women who were not his wife, wrote a threatening letter and sent the package to King at home.

"King," Sullivan wrote, "look into your heart. There is only one way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal, fraudulent self is bared to the nation."

"Your FBI at work," said Maddow. . . .


[II] NYPD: THESE MOSQUES ARE TERRORIST OPERATIONS (SHH!)
NYPD designates mosques as terrorism organizations

ADAM GOLDMAN and MATT APUZZO
Published: Yesterday

NEW YORK (AP) -- The New York Police Department has secretly labeled entire mosques as terrorist organizations, a designation that allows police to use informants to record sermons and spy on imams, often without specific evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

Designating an entire mosque as a terrorism enterprise means that anyone who attends prayer services there is a potential subject of an investigation and fair game for surveillance.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the NYPD has opened at least a dozen "terrorism enterprise investigations" into mosques, according to interviews and confidential police documents. The TEI, as it is known, is a police tool intended to help investigate terrorist cells and the like.

Many TEIs stretch for years, allowing surveillance to continue even though the NYPD has never criminally charged a mosque or Islamic organization with operating as a terrorism enterprise.

The documents show in detail how, in its hunt for terrorists, the NYPD investigated countless innocent New York Muslims and put information about them in secret police files. As a tactic, opening an enterprise investigation on a mosque is so potentially invasive that while the NYPD conducted at least a dozen, the FBI never did one, according to interviews with federal law enforcement officials.

The strategy has allowed the NYPD to send undercover officers into mosques and attempt to plant informants on the boards of mosques and at least one prominent Arab-American group in Brooklyn, whose executive director has worked with city officials, including Bill de Blasio, a front-runner for mayor. . . .


[III] HOW MUCH "INTELLIGENCE" DOES $52.6B BUY?
(Courtesy of Public Enemy No. 1, Edward Snowden)

U.S. spy network's successes, failures and objectives detailed in 'black budget' summary

By Barton Gellman and Greg Miller
Thursday, August 29, 1:02PM

U.S. spy agencies have built an intelligence-gathering colossus since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but remain unable to provide critical information to the president on a range of national security threats, according to the government's top secret budget.

The $52.6 billion "black budget" for fiscal 2013, obtained by The Washington Post from former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden, maps a bureaucratic and operational landscape that has never been subject to public scrutiny. Although the government has annually released its overall level of intelligence spending since 2007, it has not divulged how it uses those funds or how it performs against the goals set by the president and Congress.

The 178-page budget summary for the National Intelligence Program details the successes, failures and objectives of the 16 spy agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, which has 107,035 employees.

The summary describes cutting-edge technologies, agent recruiting and ongoing operations. The Washington Post is withholding some information after consultation with U.S. officials who expressed concerns about the risk to intelligence sources and methods. Sensitive details are so pervasive in the documents that The Post is publishing only summary tables and charts online.

"The United States has made a considerable investment in the Intelligence Community since the terror attacks of 9/11, a time which includes wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, and asymmetric threats in such areas as cyber-warfare," Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. said in response to inquiries from The Post.

"Our budgets are classified as they could provide insight for foreign intelligence services to discern our top national priorities, capabilities and sources and methods that allow us to obtain information to counter threats," he said. . . .

SPEAKING OF EDWARD SNOWDEN'S BOUNTY:
WE LEARN MORE ABOUT THE BIN LADEN HUNT



The Washington Post is also reporting today, drawing on these same super-hush-hush "black budget" documents, that "the U.S. commando raid that killed Osama bin Laden was guided from space by a fleet of satellites, which aimed dozens of separate receivers over Pakistan to collect a torrent of electronic and signals intelligence as the mission unfolded," that the NSA was "able to penetrate guarded communications among al-Qaeda operatives by tracking calls from mobile phones identified by specific calling patterns," that CIA analysts "pinpointed the geographic location of one of the phones and tied it to the compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where an accumulation of other evidence suggested bin Laden was hiding," that "eight hours after the raid a forensic intelligence laboratory run by the Defense Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan had analyzed DNA from bin Laden’s corpse and 'provided a conclusive match' confirming his identity," among other details of the operation.

*

For a "Sunday Classics" fix anytime, visit the stand-alone "Sunday Classics with Ken."

Labels: , , , , , , , , ,

Monday, February 04, 2013

Speaking of Mali and Syria: NYT reporters and editors can hardly show us connections between stories which they don't see themselves

>

Okay, so we see Algeria and Mali over there on the left of the map (which you can click on to enlarge), and Syria is at the upper right, and Afghanistan is way the heck off the map to the right, and the Soviet Union isn't on the map at all anymore, and Osama bin Laden is, um, still dead. No way they're connected, is there?

"[I]ncredibly, one [piece] offers an example of what can go wrong when a government -- Algeria -- cozies up with a bloodthirsty killer and religious fanatic, while the other tells how the US government is in the process of doing exactly the same thing in Syria."

by Ken

Dave Lindorff has a terrific piece today on his ThisCan'tBeHappening.net "news collective" blog: "Links? We Don’t Do No Stinkin’ Links: Cognitive Dissonance at the New York Times," which I saw via Nation of Change. It's about two articles from Saturday's NYT which he eventually characterizes as "two disjointed and poorly written pieces that add little to the readers' understanding of these latest hotspots in the Middle East":

"Algeria Sowed Seeds of Hostage Crisis as It Nurtured Warlord" by Adam Nossiter and Neil MacFarquhar
[which] reports on how the Algerian government essentially enabled and encouraged the crisis in neighboring Mali by backing -- even hosting in Algiers -- an Islamic militant leader and local warlord, Iyad Ag Ghali, who then tried to take over Mali by force, including taking Algerians and other foreigners hostage at an oil drilling site, leading to a deadly Algerian battle and now a war in Mali that has drawn in the old colonial powers. The article talked at length about the risks of working with such militants. The risks for Algeria, that is; not the risks in general of such a practice.
"A Rebel Commander in Syria Holds the Reins of War"
[which is] a glowing paen to Abdulkader al-Saleh, aka Hajji Marea, a rebel leader in the Syrian civil war. The article paints the man whose nom de guerre is comfortingly (and incorrectly) translated as meaning "the respectable man from Marea" (it actually means "the man from Marea who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca"), is clearly aligned with a radical Muslim group, the Al Nusra Front, which the article notes, is "blacklisted" by the US as a terrorist organization.
Already in these capsule descriptions of Dave's, I think we can see him nudging these pieces together in ways that seem clearly not have occurred to either the NYT writers or their editors. Dave is mightily ticked off because the paper "managed to run two closely related stories making opposite points in Saturday's paper without referencing each other," either in the print edition or online.
Typically, when two articles that are clearly related run in a newspaper, they are run side-by-side, with one appearing as a kind of side-bar to the other. In this case, though, the first article, on the warlord Iyad Ag Ghali, ran on page one, jumping to page eight, while the second, on Hajji Marea, ran on page 9, separated by several other articles in the intervening columns of both pages. Even in the Times' online edition, where it is easy -- and standard procedure -- to include links to relevant other articles, there is no link between these two stories.
Dave offers as an additional criticism what I imagine he would agree is at least in part an explanation for his original one: "Nor do the reporters on either piece include any historical background or context in their reports."
Thus Times readers are left blissfully unaware of the many examples of blowback that the US has experienced from its decades of such faustian bargains. The most damaging of these, of course, was the CIA's setting up of the Al Qaeda organization during the Jimmy Carter presidency, when he and his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski came up with the brilliant idea of encouraging, funding and arming local and foreign Islamic fanatics to foment a civil war in Afghanistan with the goal of undermining the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul and "bleeding" the Soviet Union. Of course, the US-funded and armed Mujahadeen became the Taliban, and among those foreign Islamic fanatics that the CIA- trained and armed to fight the Soviets was Osama Bin Laden and his merry band.

And we know how that turned out.

Surely at least a paragraph reference to that debacle would be in order when one is writing about the latest disastrous Algerian experience with blowback, or about America's latest support for religious fundamentalist fighters in its campaign to oust Syria's current government.
Of course, once you remove this background, the connections between the Algeria-Mali and Syrian-warlord stories are a good deal less clear, and it's not all that surprising that we wind up with this pair of "disjointed and poorly written pieces that add little to the readers' understanding of these latest hotspots in the Middle East."
And yet, incredibly, one offers an example of what can go wrong when a government -- Algeria -- cozies up with a bloodthirsty killer and religious fanatic, while the other tells how the US government is in the process of doing exactly the same thing in Syria.
Hmm, there just might be a story there, don't you think? Or maybe at least a link.
#

Labels: , , , , , ,

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

9/11 and the case for reality (Part 2): The right-wing worldview has long coupled delusions with lies, not least in matters of "national security"

>

Has anyone every been less entitled to a say in our national security?

by Ken

Last night I announced an overall subject for that post and tonight's, "9/11 and the case for reality." Part 1 dealt with reality checks "In the world of science, and in the life and work of Salman Rushdie and Philip Roth," and at the end I suggested that I couldn't imagine more suitable material for a 9/11 post" today than a pair of Tom Engelhardt's TomGrams -- a new one from Jeremiah Goulka, "Confessions of a Former Republican," and one from 2010 to which Jeremiah G harks back, Andrew Bacevich's "How Washington Rules."

In the meantime, our friend John Puma added a comment with a link to a NYT op-ed, "The Deafness Before the Storm," by former NYT reporter and current Vanity Fair contributing editor Kurt Eichenwald, based on his new book, 500 Days: Secrets and Lies in the Terror Wars, which is exactly on topic. As it happens, I heard Eichenwald this morning on NPR's Morning Edition, and what he has to say is a good deal more disturbing than what we already knew about the Bush regime's cavalier dismissal, from the time it took office right up to 9/11/2001, of warnings about the threat to the U.S. posed by Osama bin Laden.

We've known for ages about the famous August 6 daily intelligence briefing delivered to Chimpy the Prez with what Eichenwald describes as "the now-infamous heading: 'Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.'” Let's pick up the story here, from his op-ed piece:
On April 10, 2004, the Bush White House declassified that daily brief -- and only that daily brief -- in response to pressure from the 9/11 Commission, which was investigating the events leading to the attack. Administration officials dismissed the document's significance, saying that, despite the jaw-dropping headline, it was only an assessment of Al Qaeda'’s history, not a warning of the impending attack. While some critics considered that claim absurd, a close reading of the brief showed that the argument had some validity.

That is, unless it was read in conjunction with the daily briefs preceding Aug. 6, the ones the Bush administration would not release. While those documents are still not public, I have read excerpts from many of them, along with other recently declassified records, and come to an inescapable conclusion: the administration's reaction to what Mr. Bush was told in the weeks before that infamous briefing reflected significantly more negligence than has been disclosed. In other words, the Aug. 6 document, for all of the controversy it provoked, is not nearly as shocking as the briefs that came before it.

The direct warnings to Mr. Bush about the possibility of a Qaeda attack began in the spring of 2001. By May 1, the Central Intelligence Agency told the White House of a report that "a group presently in the United States" was planning a terrorist operation. Weeks later, on June 22, the daily brief reported that Qaeda strikes could be "imminent," although intelligence suggested the time frame was flexible.

Nonsense, said the geniuses who had assumed positions of authority in the Bush regime's National Insecurity regime. "An intelligence official and a member of the Bush administration" told Eichenwald that the neocon imbeciles (well, that's my word) though bin Laden was bluffing, trying to distract their genius selves from the real threat, Saddam Hussein. The CIA, it appears, did everything in its power to persuade the geniuses -- and the nincompoop president -- that they were wrong.

We know how that worked out. No matter how much information the CIA produced, and no matter how much detail it included, the neocon geniuses not only ignored it but attempted to discredit the people who were trying to penetrate that wall of arrogance and ignorance. And then, after 9/11 happened, those people, whose first instinct apparently is always to lie, lied their corrupt, criminal heads off.

The neocons came into power dead set on war with Iraq, and nothing was going to stop them. So the CIA found itself under sustained assault from "Big Dick" Cheney, who was not only the most corrupt, arrogant, and dishonest person ever to set foot in the White House but the stupidest, forcing its analysts to spew lies that supported, or at least didn't contradict, its lies. By rights, perhaps allowing a decent interval after the 9/11 attacks, "Big Dick" should have gone on TV, accompanied by some of the other architects of U.S. unpreparedness, and they should all have blown their useless brains out.

MAYBE "CONSERVATISM" WAS ONCE AN IDEOLOGY. NOW
IT'S A COMBINATION OF PSYCHOSIS, DELUSION, AND SCAM


Since Andrew Bacevich's repurposed work has been focused on national-security issues, his conversion concerns us more directly tonight. He came to his awakening at age 41, following a couple of decades of military service. As he explained in the introduction to his 2010 book The Unmaking of a Company Man: An Education Begun in the Shadow of the Brandenburg Gate, which Tom Engelhardt reprinted as Andrew B's TomGram:
By temperament and upbringing, I had always taken comfort in orthodoxy. In a life spent subject to authority, deference had become a deeply ingrained habit. I found assurance in conventional wisdom. Now, I started, however hesitantly, to suspect that orthodoxy might be a sham. I began to appreciate that authentic truth is never simple and that any version of truth handed down from on high -- whether by presidents, prime ministers, or archbishops -- is inherently suspect. The powerful, I came to see, reveal truth only to the extent that it suits them. Even then, the truths to which they testify come wrapped in a nearly invisible filament of dissembling, deception, and duplicity. The exercise of power necessarily involves manipulation and is antithetical to candor.

I came to these obvious points embarrassingly late in life. “Nothing is so astonishing in education,” the historian Henry Adams once wrote, “as the amount of ignorance it accumulates in the form of inert facts.” Until that moment I had too often confused education with accumulating and cataloging facts. In Berlin, at the foot of the Brandenburg Gate, I began to realize that I had been a naïf. And so, at age 41, I set out, in a halting and haphazard fashion, to acquire a genuine education.

For Andrew B, it was seeing the reality of the former East Germany, totally at odds with what he had been led to believe, that began opening his eyes.
Bit by bit, my worldview started to crumble.

That worldview had derived from this conviction: that American power manifested a commitment to global leadership, and that both together expressed and affirmed the nation’s enduring devotion to its founding ideals. That American power, policies, and purpose were bound together in a neat, internally consistent package, each element drawing strength from and reinforcing the others, was something I took as a given. That, during my adult life, a penchant for interventionism had become a signature of U.S. policy did not -- to me, at least -- in any way contradict America’s aspirations for peace. Instead, a willingness to expend lives and treasure in distant places testified to the seriousness of those aspirations. That, during this same period, the United States had amassed an arsenal of over 31,000 nuclear weapons, some small number of them assigned to units in which I had served, was not at odds with our belief in the inalienable right to life and liberty; rather, threats to life and liberty had compelled the United States to acquire such an arsenal and maintain it in readiness for instant use.

He has a lot more to say on the subject, but for tonight I think we get the idea. Jeremiah Goulka's awakening from his former life as "a serious Republican, moderate and business-oriented" covers a lot more than national security, and we'll come back to that tomorrow, but his original political orientation clearly includes the right-wing mindset:
Lots of Republicans grow up hawks. I certainly did. My sense of what it meant to be an American was linked to my belief that from 1776 to WWII, and even from the 1991 Gulf War to Kosovo and Afghanistan, the American military had been dedicated to birthing freedom and democracy in the world, while dispensing a tough and precise global justice.

What both men are talking about are the lies and delusions that lay at the heart of foreign policy -- in the name of "national security" -- in the Bush regime. And today is the anniversary of what should be its eternal shame.
#

Labels: , , ,

Sunday, May 06, 2012

Joe Conason suggests right-wingers are mad at the president for beating them at their chest-thumping game

>


"This is one of the reasons President Obama has become one of the most divisive presidents in American history."
-- GOP doodyhead Ed Gillespie

by Ken

I know the country has decided that it's A-OK that every word out of the mouth of every right-winger is frothy, thuggish lie. By that standard, of course, the Right-eous rage prompted by the Obama campaign's suggestion that Willard Inc. wouldn't have taken out Osama bin-Laden, is perfectly justified. Who's better equipped to manage the triple feat of lying about what the president and the would-be president, and the former president said about Osama bin-Laden? Not to mention erasing their heroes' unbroken history of screaming jingoism -- most notably in the record of America's forgotten-but-not-gone ex-hero, Chimpy the Accomplished-Mission.

I like Joe Conason's take in his syndicated column "Why Obama's bin Laden Ad Drives Republicans Crazy":
Nothing aggravates Republicans like seeing nasty, effective tactics upon which they have so long relied being turned against one of their candidates. So when Barack Obama's re-election campaign aired an ad celebrating the anniversary of Osama bin Laden's death -- and suggesting that Mitt Romney wouldn't have achieved that objective -- the right exploded with outraged protests.

Evidently, the feelings of longtime hatchet men like Bush-era party chair Ed Gillespie, ex-Bush flack Ari Fleischer and the editorial writers at The Wall Street Journal, to name a few, were really, really hurt — because the Obama campaign exploited a moment of national unity for partisan advantage.
Then Joe uncorks the Ed Gillespie corker I've put at the top of this post. Yup, it's Barack the Kenyan Milquetoast Moderate who's caused all that divisiveness, not thug-brained right-wingers.

During the Bush presidency," Joe recalls, "Republicans used precisely the same approach and worse, over and over, without fretting whether their words and ads were 'divisive.' "
It began weeks after the 9/11 attacks, amid sincere pledges of patriotic cooperation from congressional Democrats, when Karl Rove told the Republican National Committee that their party would "go to the country on this issue" to win the midterm elections in 2002. They won a historic victory by sliming wounded Vietnam hero Max Cleland and former Air Force intelligence officer Tom Daschle as stooges of al-Qaida.

Bush's 2004 re-election campaign amplified the same themes, with advertising and pageantry at the Republican convention in New York City grossly exploiting 9/11, a series of conveniently timed terror "alerts" leading up to Election Day and repeated warnings by Vice President Dick Cheney that a Democratic victory would signal weakness to America's enemies.

And it persisted into the 2006 midterm, with Rove falsely portraying Democrats as limp-wristed "liberals" trying to "understand" Osama bin Laden.

Until that election, the rough Rovian style succeeded brilliantly -- despite the fact that Bush and Cheney had actually allowed bin Laden and Mullah Omar to escape at Tora Bora.

"By contrast," Joe says, "the Obama ad's brief rebuke of Romney is at least factual and accurate."
Not only did he say what the ad quotes, but he also said that he wouldn't go into Pakistan to get bin Laden, which is what the mission required. Had the president followed Romney's policy recommendation, bin Laden would almost certainly still be at large.

Joe gets off a parting shot at Willard the Gutless War Wimp:
"Even Jimmy Carter would have given that order," scoffed Romney in response. But he shouldn't be so quick to denigrate the former Democratic president, who entered the Navy during World War II and then served as a submarine officer until his honorable discharge in 1953. Somebody may compare Carter's service with Romney's own military record, which doesn't exist -- and remind voters that he avoided the Vietnam draft with a pampered stint as a Mormon missionary, in France.

Not to mention Willard's hulking brood of Junior War Wimps.
#

Labels: , , , , ,